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A market has network externalities if a consumer’s utility from purchasing a product depends on which other consumers buy the same product. A high-
lighted special case of this is two-sided markets with network externalities. In these 
markets, consumers are divided into two distinct subgroups. A consumer’s utility on 
one side increases in the total number of consumers on the other side of the market 
who buy the same product (and possibly decreases in the number of consumers on 
the same side of the market). This applies to various situations in which two groups 
of agents need a common platform to interact and one or more firms own platforms 
and sell access to them. The higher the number of agents on one side who join a 
platform, the higher the utility of an agent on the other side of the platform, because 
that agent has a higher number of potential partners with whom to trade or interact. 
Examples of these types of networks include payment card systems, where the two 
sides are cardholders and merchants; videogame platforms, where the two sides are 
game developers and final users; managed care plans, where the two sides are health 
providers and patients; classified advertising; and directory services.
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Asymmetric Networks in Two-Sided Markets†
By Attila Ambrus and Rossella Argenziano*
This paper investigates pricing decisions and network choices in two-
sided markets with network externalities. Consumers are heteroge-
neous in how much they value the externality. Imposing restrictions 
on the extent of coordination failure among consumers generates 
clear qualitative conclusions about equilibrium market configura-
tions. Multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium, 
both in the case of a monopolist network provider and in the case 
of competing providers. These equilibria have the property that one 
network is cheaper and larger on one side, while the other network 
is cheaper and larger on the other side. Product differentiation is 
endogenized by consumers’ network choices. (JEL D85, L12, L13, 
L14, D42, D43)
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Because of positive network externalities, the utility of every consumer is maxi-
mized if all of them join the same platform. Despite this, multiple large networks 
coexist in many of these markets. This observation holds both for markets in which 
there is a monopolist network provider (the same owner operates multiple networks) 
and for markets in which there are multiple competing providers. Furthermore, dif-
ferent networks in the same market are often priced quite differently. One type of 
market structure seems to be particularly common in two-sided markets. It involves 
two networks: one being cheaper and larger on one side of the market and the other 
being cheaper and larger on the other side. This configuration typically implies that 
most of the profit from operating a network comes from one side of the market, and 
that the two networks target different market sides. The cheap side of a network, 
which can even be subsidized and therefore generate loss, is used to create a large 
enough consumer base that makes it attractive for consumers on the other side of the 
market to join the network.1
This paper investigates the conditions for multiple asymmetric networks coexist-
ing in a two-sided market with network externalities. Our primary interests are to 
understand the decisions of firms regarding how many networks to operate and how 
to price them, and to investigate the resulting market shares on different sides of 
the market. We address these questions using an extensive form game. In the first 
stage, firms establish networks. In the second stage, they announce registration fees 
for these networks. In the third stage, consumers simultaneously choose networks 
or decide to stay out of the market. We investigate both the case of a monopolist 
network provider and the case of competing network providers. A central feature 
of our model is that we allow for heterogeneity among consumers with respect to 
how much they care about the externality (how much they value if there are a lot of 
consumers from the other side of the market on the same platform). This opens up 
a set of questions that have not been addressed in the existing literature: whether in 
equilibrium it is possible that different networks attract different types of consumers, 
and whether price discrimination among different types of consumers is possible in 
the absence of physical product differentiation.
As in all models with positive network externalities, there is a severe multiplicity 
of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in our game. To select among them, we use the 
concept of coalitional rationalizability proposed by Ambrus (2006). This solution 
concept allows groups of players to coordinate on playing certain strategies if it 
is in their mutual interest. The formal solution concept we use is subgame perfect 
Nash equilibria in which players play coalitionally rationalizable strategies in every 
subgame. The concept implies that after certain price announcements consumers 
can successfully coordinate on joining a particular network. For example, if there 
are two networks and one of them is cheaper on both sides of the market, then all 
consumers for whom it is not an iteratively dominated strategy to join some network 
end up joining the cheaper network. However, in other cases, when there is no focal 
network on which to coordinate, the concept does not necessarily impose successful 
coordination. In particular, the concept we use is strictly weaker in our setting than 
1 See Section II for several examples of this type of network structure in different settings.
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extensive form coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (B. Douglas Bernheim, Bezalel 
Peleg, and Michael D. Whinston 1987).2 This is in accordance with what we believe 
is a reasonable assumption for a market in which there is a large number of partici-
pants. In some cases, where there is a focal choice, coordination is successful, while 
in other cases it might not be. The concept we use is not related to requiring Pareto 
efficiency in subgames after price announcements. In particular, if consumers are 
heterogeneous, then Pareto efficiency can be a very weak requirement in the games 
we analyze. This is our main motivation for using a solution concept that considers 
coordination by subgroups of players (coalitions). Even if the set of all consumers 
cannot successfully coordinate on choosing a network, there might be focal choices 
for certain subgroups, establishing successful coordination within these groups.
We investigate the possibility of multiple asymmetric networks in coalition per-
fect equilibrium, and show that remarkably similar results hold for the case of a 
monopolist network provider as to the case of competing providers. For a monopo-
list provider, we show that if consumers are homogeneous in the sense of having 
the same reservation value for the network good (an assumption imposed in most 
of the related literature), then only one network is established in equilibrium. The 
reason is that dividing consumers into multiple networks would entail losing some 
gross consumer surplus, which would decrease the monopolist’s profit. In case of 
competing providers, homogeneous consumers imply that either there is only one 
active network in equilibrium (all consumers join the same network), or there are 
two perfectly symmetric networks. In either case, both firms’ profits are zero, just 
like in classic Bertrand competition without externalities. This holds despite the fact 
that equilibrium prices do not have to be equal to the marginal cost. Consumers 
on one side of the market can be subsidized while the other side might face a price 
above marginal cost.
The above results can be extended to cases when there is not too much heteroge-
neity among consumers (the ratio of reservation values between any two consumers 
is smaller than a certain threshold). However, we show that multiple asymmetric 
networks can coexist in coalition perfect equilibrium if there is enough heterogene-
ity among consumers.
A monopolist provider might want to establish two networks, which in equilibrium 
are joined by different types of consumers. The intuition is that, if there are consum-
ers with high reservation values on both sides of the market, then the monopolist 
wants to extract surplus from both of these groups. However, if there are relatively 
few of these consumers and the monopolist operates only one network, then he can 
charge a high price on at most one side. In order to charge a high price, there must 
be enough consumers on the other side of the network, which is only possible if the 
price charged on the other side is low. However, if the monopolist establishes two 
networks such that one of them is cheap on one side of the market and the other 
network is cheap on the other side, then all consumers are willing to join some net-
work, and consumers with high reservation values are willing to join the network 
that is more expensive for them. The way price discrimination is achieved in these 
2 Despite this, the qualitative conclusions of the model would be unchanged if we used coalition-proof Nash 
equilibrium as the solution concept. See the discussion on this in Section III.
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equilibria is through endogenous product differentiation. Networks are physically 
the same, but if one side of a network attracts many consumers, then the other side 
of the network becomes more valuable.
The same type of asymmetric equilibrium, in which different networks attract 
different types of consumers, can arise if there are competing network providers in 
the market. Moreover, in these equilibria, firms can get positive profits in Bertrand 
competition. The intuition is that although firms can steal each other’s consumers by 
undercutting their rival’s prices on both sides of the market, this strategy is not nec-
essarily profitable. In particular, undercutting might increase the number of consum-
ers to be subsidized more than the number of consumers who pay a positive price.
We show that in both the monopoly and duopoly cases, and for any distribution of 
consumer utility functions, all asymmetric equilibria with multiple active networks 
have the same qualitative features as the examples we provide. Namely, one network 
is cheaper and larger on one side of the market, and the other is larger and cheaper 
on the other side.
I. Related Literature
Recently, a number of papers investigated the issue of optimal pricing and price 
competition in markets with two-sided network externalities. For a more extensive 
literature review see, for example, Mark Armstrong (2006).
Marie-Odile Yanelle (1997) investigates competition in financial intermediation. 
She shows that Bertrand competition need not lead to zero profits, as is the case in 
our model. The reason why this can happen is quite different in our model than in 
Yanelle’s model, however. In the latter, it is crucial that the intermediaries compete 
sequentially for the two sides of the market. This makes undercutting a competitor’s 
price not necessarily an effective strategy. In our setup, network providers compete 
simultaneously for consumers on the two sides of the market, and undercutting is 
always effective (it “steals” all the consumers from the other network) but, as we 
show, not necessarily profitable.
Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole (2003) and Armstrong (2006) study monop-
olistic pricing and price competition between two firms on markets where the 
firms are platforms that try to attract two groups of agents. The models in these 
papers abstract away from coordination problems among consumers. They assume 
differentiable demand functions for the networks, implicitly assuming differenti-
ated networks (i.e., assuming that consumers have heterogeneous inherent prefer-
ences between networks). Also, they focus on a particular symmetric equilibrium. 
Moreover, Rochet and Tirole emphasize the case in which the networks’ primary 
pricing instruments are transaction fees.
Bruno Jullien (2001) constructs a duopoly model that allows for more than two 
subgroups of consumers and for both inter-group and intra-group network externali-
ties. The context of this paper differs from ours mainly in that the intrinsic value of 
the good sold by each firm is assumed to be high compared to the network effect.
Glenn Ellison, Drew Fudenberg, and Markus Mobius (2004) study competition 
between two auction sites. In their model, as in ours, multiple asymmetric platforms 
can coexist in equilibrium despite the lack of product differentiation. In addition to 
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this, they assume heterogeneous agents on both sides of the market. On the other 
hand, consumers choose platforms ex ante in their model, while in our paper, con-
sumers do so after learning about their types. Furthermore, the reason that multiple 
active networks can coexist in equilibrium is completely different in their model. 
They consider a finite number of buyers and sellers. Thus, when one of them switches 
from one platform to another, he adversely affects the market price on the latter plat-
form.3 In our model, there is a continuum of consumers on both sides of the market; 
therefore, this market-impact effect is absent.
The model in Ettore Damiano and Hao Li (2007, forthcoming) is similar to ours 
in that consumers in a two-sided market are heterogeneous, and that registration 
fees serve the role of separating different types of consumers. The main differ-
ence between our setup and theirs is that there is no network externality in theirs. 
Consumers care about the average quality, not the number, of consumers on the 
other side of the network. Whereas in our model, consumers are symmetric with 
respect to the external effect they generate on consumers on the other side.
The model closest to ours is presented by Bernard Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 
2003). They analyze markets where firms are intermediaries offering matchmaking 
services to two groups of agents. The above papers assume that consumers on each 
side are homogeneous, and that their utilities are linear in the number of consumers 
on the other side of the network.4 The assumption of homogeneity implies that these 
papers do not address most of the issues we investigate in this paper. Also, Caillaud 
and Jullien select among equilibria by imposing monotonicity of the demand func-
tion of consumers and by assuming full market coverage in equilibrium. Instead of 
making an assumption about the aggregate demand function, our paper imposes 
restrictions directly on the expectations of individual players.
In our model, different types of consumers might elect to join different networks. 
In this aspect, our analysis is connected to the literature on price discrimination (for 
an overview see Hal R. Varian 1989), multi-product pricing (see William J. Baumol, 
John C. Panzar, and Robert D. Willig 1982), and the theory of screening (for an 
overview see Bernard Salanie 1997).
II. Motivating Examples: Asymmetric Networks in Various Two-Sided Markets
The existence of multiple networks with different pricing strategies is a common 
phenomenon in two-sided markets. One network structure that appears in a wide 
variety of markets involves two networks: one that is larger and cheaper on one side 
of the market, and one that is larger and cheaper on the other side. This section pro-
vides examples in different settings.
The two main platforms in the market for online job search in the United 
States are Careerbuilder.com and Monster.com. The companies operating these 
Web sites act as intermediaries between employers and job seekers. Monster.com 
has a database of 56 million resumes versus Careerbuilder’s 13 million. Therefore, 
3 See Glen Ellison and Drew Fudenberg (2003) for a detailed analysis of this point.
4 For a comparison between our results in this context and the ones of Caillaud and Jullien (2003), see Sub-
section VA.
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Monster.com is larger on the job seekers’ side. On the other hand, in February 2004, 
Careerbuilder had 45.2 percent of online job postings in the United States, while 
Monster had only 37.5 percent.5 Therefore, Careerbuilder is larger on this side. To 
buy two-week access to Careerbuilder’s national database, a firm pays $500, while 
two-week access to Monster’s national database costs $950.6
Another example comes from the early history of the payment card industry. 
A payment card constitutes a platform that allows cardholders and merchants to 
complete their transactions. The first card to be introduced was the Diners Club 
charge card in 1949–1950, and it made most of its revenues on the merchants side. 
A few years later, American Express introduced its own payment card and chose the 
opposite pricing strategy. Quoting from David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee 
(2005): “American Express adopted a slightly different pricing policy than Diners 
Club. It initially set its annual fee at $31, $5 higher than Diners Club, thereby sug-
gesting that it was the more “exclusive” card. But it set the initial merchant discount 
slightly lower: 5 to 7 percent for restaurants; and 3 to 5 percent for the recalcitrant 
hotel industry.”7
In the US health insurance market, the vast majority of the population is enrolled 
in some form of managed care plan, which acts as a platform connecting health care 
providers and patients. A very common type of managed care plan is the Preferred 
Provider Organization (PPO). Sherman Folland, Allen Goodman, and Miron Stano 
(2004) describe them as follows: “PPO’s give subscribers two distinct tiers of cover-
age. When subscribers use the PPO’s preferred provider network, the required cost 
sharing is lower than when they use nonnetwork providers. … Patients simply must 
pay more out of pocket if they choose to go outside the network. … PPO contracts 
with physicians and hospitals generally address the prices providers will charge the 
PPO. In return for promising to charge a lower than average price, selected providers 
become part of the PPO’s preferred network. No guarantee is given that the provider 
will see patients under the plan, but if the network is not too large and the PPO’s 
cost-sharing provisions for subscribers are network-favorable, then the provider may 
enjoy a large increase in patient care business by joining the network.” 8 To summa-
rize, a PPO typically operates two networks. One has a smaller set of providers and 
a large number of patients. This network is cheap for the patients, while providers 
are compensated less by the PPO for their services. The other network has many 
providers and a smaller number of patients. This network is expensive for patients, 
but providers get higher compensation for their services.
In the videogame market, the major competing platforms are PCs and a number 
of game consoles. The two sides of this market are players and game developers. 
For players, buying any of the game consoles currently on the market is significantly 
5 2004 February figures. The information about the size of the two databases was obtained from the customer 
service departments of Careerbuilder and Monster. The prices for database access are available on each Web site. 
The information about the number of job postings was obtained from Corzen.
6 The base cost of posting a résumé is zero on both sites, but job seekers pay extra fees for preferential treat-
ment of their résumés (e.g., if they want them to come up at the top of search result lists obtained by firms). We 
do not have information on how many job seekers pay these extra fees. Therefore, we cannot make a correct price 
comparison on this side of the market.
7 Evans and Schmalensee (2005, 59).
8 Folland, Goodman, and Stano (2004, 256).
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cheaper than buying a PC configuration on which most games are enjoyable.9 Game 
developers face the opposite price pattern. Publishing a game for a console requires 
paying royalties to the producer of the console, while publishing on PC is virtually 
free.10 Accordingly, most of the profit of console producers comes from royalties 
paid by game developers (typically the sales price of the console machines are sub-
sidized, so by itself it generates a loss). As a result of the above pricing policies, 
the number of games that are available for a PC is very high, given that large game 
developers tend to multi-home on all platforms, while small, independent developers 
publish only on PC.11 At the same time, the estimated number of players using one 
of the popular game consoles considerably exceeds the number of players using a 
PC, judging by end-of-the-year sales statistics comparing different platforms.12
Finally, the type of network differentiation above is common in the market for 
classified ads as well. In many towns, there is a classified ad magazine that can be 
bought at newspaper stands, and there is also a freely distributed one. For advertis-
ers, it is typically more expensive to place an ad in the freely distributed magazine, 
since it reaches a wider audience. For a concrete example, we acquired data from 
this market in Naples, Italy. The most popular classified ads magazine, “Bric-a-brac” 
(B.a.B.) (the third most sold journal in the region after the two main newspapers) 
costs 1,70€ and sells 13,000 copies every week. Its publisher, Inthesa FA s.r.l., also 
publishes a free press publication: “Free magazine motori (F.M.M.),” which has a 
circulation of 75,000 copies.13 Both contain paid and free ads. A paid ad on F.M.M. 
costs about twice as much as the same ad on B.a.B.14
III. The Model
We consider a standard model of price competition in two-sided markets with 
network externalities. It is a sequential move game in which first firms announce 
prices, then consumers observe the announcements, and finally consumers choose 
which network to join, if any. We examine the cases of one or two firms operating 
in the market. The new features of our model are the following. First, consumers 
are not assumed to be homogeneous in how much they value the network good. 
Second, we do not make any restriction on the utility functions of consumers besides 
quasi-linearity in money. Third, in the monopoly case, we allow the firm to choose 
the number of networks to be established.
9 Among the standard requirements are: a fast processor, ample RAM, and a high-end video card.
10 See David S. Evans, Andrei Hagiu, and Richard Schmalensee (2005) and “PC Gaming is NOT Dead, 
People,” http://www.gamespot.com/features/burningquestions/?story=6122826.
11 See for example “The State of Church: Doug Church on the Death of PC Gaming and the Future of Defining 
Gameplay,” http://www.gamasutra.com/features/20041123/hall_01.shtml and “Interview: Ritual’s Robert Atkins 
on Console Life, PC Death,” http://www.gamasutra.com/features/20050630/wen_01.shtml.
12 See “The NPD Group reports annual 2004 US video game industry retail sales,” http://www.npdfun-
world.com/funServlet?nextpage=pr_body.html&content_id=2076 and “The NPD Group reports on retail sales 
of US video game industry for first half 2005,” http://www.npdfunworld.com/funServlet?nextpage=pr_body.
html&content_id=2173.
13 Source: Inthesa FA s.r.l.
14 F.M.M. is in color, while B.a.B. is black and white, but the normal surcharge for color on this market is 
20 percent to 30 percent, so at least 70 percent of the surcharge is due to the larger circulation.
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Formally, the set of players in the model are two different sets of consumers (cor-
responding to the two sides of the market) and one or two platform providers. We 
assume there is a continuum of consumers on both sides of the market indexed by 
the interval 30, 14 .
We consider a three-stage game with observable actions (i.e., after every stage, all 
players observe all action choices made in that stage).
In the first stage, the firms simultaneously choose how many networks to estab-
lish. We will restrict attention to cases in which the maximum number of networks 
a firm can operate is either one (in which case the decision at this stage is trivial) or 
two.
In the second stage, the firms simultaneously set prices (registration fees) for the 
established networks. Firms can charge different registration fees on different net-
works or on different sides of the same network. Furthermore, they can charge nega-
tive prices on either side of the networks (subsidizing consumers on that side).15 Let 
pk
j denote the price of network k on side j. If there is only one network established, 
then we drop the subscript from the notation.
In the third stage, the consumers simultaneously choose which network to 
join, if any. We assume that a consumer can join at most one network (exclusivity 
of networks).16 Let nk
j denote the total number of consumers on side j who join 
network k.
Firms maximize profits. We assume that firms are identical and that the cost of 
operating a network is zero, independent of the number of consumers joining the 
network.17 Therefore, the payoff of the firm is the sum of the revenues collected 
from the firm’s networks, where the revenue collected from a network is the sum of 
the revenue collected on side one and the revenue collected on side two. The profit 
accumulated at network k is g2j51 pkj  nkj .
Consumer i on side j maximizes the individual-specific utility function ui
j. Let 
ui
j 5 0 if she does not join any network. Let ui
j 5 gi
j 1nk2j2 2 pkj if she joins network 
k. Assume gi
j 102 5 0, and that gij is strictly increasing for every consumer Cij.18 A 
consumer’s utility when joining a network is quasilinear in money and increases 
in the number of people joining the network from the other side of the market.19 
Implicit in the construction is that consumers do not have any inherent preference for 
joining one network or another. They only care about the number of people joining 
the networks and the price they have to pay.
15 It is quite common to observe that consumers on one side of a two-sided market get subsidized when they 
join a platform. Typically, the subsidy takes the form of free goods or free extra services. For example, clubs often 
offer women free entry and a free drink.
16 See Section VIB for a discussion on relaxing this assumption.
17 See Section VIA for a discussion on how the results are affected when assuming a positive marginal cost.
18 We assume that network participation is a pure network good for analytical convenience. Most results of the 
paper could be generalized to the case of gi
j 102 $ 0.
19 The above specification makes the simplifying assumption that a consumer’s utility is independent of how 
many consumers join the network on her side, implicitly assuming that interacting with consumers on the other 
side is a nonrival activity. Section VIC discusses implications of partially relaxing this assumption.
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For some of the forthcoming results, we will also assume that incremental utilities 
resulting from a given increase in the number of consumers on the other side are 
uniformly bounded by a positive constant:
A1: for every 0 # n , n9 # 1 and every j [ 51, 26 , there exists a constant d j 1n, n92 
. 0 such that gi
j 1n92 2 gij 1n2 $ d 1n, n92 5 i [ 30, 14 .
Let ui
j 5 gi
j 112 . We call uij the reservation value of consumer i on side j.
If gi
j 5 gji9 5 i, i9 [ 30, 14 and j [ 51, 26, then we say consumers are homogeneous. 
A special case of the above specification, which received attention in the existing 
literature, is when for every j 5 1, 2 and i [ 30, 14 , it holds that gij 1nk2j25ujnk2j (i.e., 
consumers on the same side have the same linear utility function).
Because of the positive network externalities, there is typically a severe multiplic-
ity of equilibria in the model presented above. We select among them by using an 
equilibrium refinement that allows players to coordinate their actions whenever coor-
dination is in their joint interest and does not require communication. The formal 
concept we use is coalitional rationalizability (Ambrus 2006). This solution concept 
builds on the idea that groups of players, or coalitions, consider implicit agreements 
to restrict their play to a certain subset of the strategy space (to avoid playing some 
strategies). These implicit agreements need to be self-enforcing. Restrictions that are 
in the mutual interest of all coalition members are called “supported” restrictions. 
The set of coalitionally rationalizable strategies is defined by an iterative procedure 
of supported restrictions by all possible coalitions, starting from the set of all strate-
gies. For the formal definition of coalitional rationalizability, see Appendix A.
In the forthcoming analysis, we restrict attention to pure strategy subgame perfect 
equilibria in which players play coalitionally rationalizable strategies in every sub-
game. We call these outcomes coalition perfect equilibria.
DEFINITION: A strategy profile is a coalition perfect equilibrium if it is a subgame 
perfect nash equilibrium and every player plays some coalitionally rationalizable 
strategy in every subgame.
The games we analyze are such that there are no credible and mutually advan-
tageous restrictions between two firms or between a firm and some consumers. 
However, coalition perfect equilibrium puts restrictions on consumers’ beliefs con-
cerning other consumers’ choices after various network choice and price announce-
ments by the firms, both on and off the equilibrium path. In particular, after certain 
price announcements, the concept implies that some consumers can successfully 
coordinate on joining the same network. This is the case when coordinating on one 
network is in some sense focal to the consumers. For example, if one network is 
cheaper on both sides of the market than the rest of the networks.20 In other sub-
games, coalition perfect equilibrium does not imply successful coordination by the 
consumers necessarily, even if they would all be better off by coordinating. This can 
20 See Appendix A for two examples on how coalitional rationalizability restricts action choices in consumer 
subgames.
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happen if one network is cheaper on one side of the market, while the other one is 
cheaper on the other side. Therefore, the concept we use assumes only a weak form 
of coordination.
There are ways to both strengthen and weaken the solution concept used without 
changing the qualitative results in the paper. A stronger concept in our context would 
be extensive form coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston 
1987).21 A weaker concept that would lead to the same results could be obtained the 
following way. The set of coalitionally rationalizable strategies corresponds to a pos-
sibly infinite sequence of implicit coalitional agreements. Arguably, this requires too 
much sophistication in the reasoning procedure of consumers. However, because of 
the simple payoff structure of the games we examine, all our results would remain 
valid if we only required one round of coalitional agreements after eliminating non-
rationalizable strategies.
The concept we use is not equivalent, in any sense, to requiring Pareto efficiency 
in consumer subgames. In consumer subgames, in which there is a unique Pareto 
efficient outcome, coalition perfect equilibrium implies that the efficient outcome 
is played. But in subgames with multiple Pareto efficient outcomes, it is consistent 
with coalition perfect equilibrium that a Pareto inefficient outcome is played. On 
the other hand, if consumers are heterogeneous, then not every Pareto efficient out-
come is consistent with coalition perfect equilibrium. Pareto efficiency only checks 
whether a given outcome can be improved for the set of all players, while coalition 
perfect equilibrium takes into account that subgroups of players can coordinate as 
well, if it is in their best interest.
The concept we use is also substantially different from the selection criterion in 
Jullien (2001), which assumes that consumers coordinate on the equilibrium that is 
most favorable to one of the firms (the incumbent).22
IV. Monopolist Network Provider
In this section, we assume that there is a monopolist network provider, and that the 
monopolist can decide whether to establish one or two platforms (to which we will 
refer as network 1 and network 2).
Our first theorem, which applies to any distribution of consumer preferences, will 
be useful in establishing the subsequent results.
The proofs of all theorems that are stated in the main section of the paper are in 
the Appendix.
21 In general, there is no containment relationship between coalition perfect equilibrium and coalition-proof 
Nash equilibrium. In the games that we analyze though the latter (coalition-proof Nash equilibrium) implies more 
effective coordination on the part of consumers. This can lead to a strictly smaller set of equilibrium prices in our 
model than what is compatible with coalition perfect equilibrium.
22 To get an intuition on how the implications of the two selection criteria differ in the context of two-sided 
markets, see Section VA. There we make a direct comparison, in a special context, between our results and those 
of Caillaud and Jullien (2001). The latter paper uses a selection criterion (full market coverage and monotonicity 
in prices) that is closely related to the one proposed by Jullien (2001).
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THEOREM 1: If there is a monopolist network provider,  then the profit of the 
monopolist in a coalition perfect equilibrium is at least as much as the maximum 
possible profit attainable by the monopolist in nash equilibrium with one network.
The intuition for this result is the following. Consider the most profitable Nash 
equilibrium, and let n * be the set of consumers joining the network in that equi-
librium. Each consumer in n * must receive nonnegative utility. Therefore, if the 
monopolist charged any set of prices smaller than those in the most profitable Nash 
equilibrium, and all the consumers in n * joined the network, each of them would 
receive a strictly positive utility. Our assumption, that consumers can coordinate their 
network choices as long as their interests are aligned, implies that, in this case, the 
consumers in n * would join the network. In particular, the monopolist can announce 
prices arbitrarily close to the prices in the most profitable Nash equilibrium and 
still make sure that all consumers in n * join the network. Therefore, the monopolist 
can achieve any profit level arbitrarily close to the level in the most profitable Nash 
equilibrium.
A. Homogeneous Consumers
We show that if consumers are homogeneous, then a monopolist network provider 
always establishes only one network.
THEOREM 2: Assume that the reservation value of every consumer on side j is 
u j 1 for j 5 1, 22 . Then in any coalition perfect equilibrium,  the monopolist estab-
lishes only one active network and charges prices equal to the reservation values. 
furthermore,  all consumers join this network.
This result is a consequence of Theorem 1. By providing one network, the firm 
can extract the maximum possible gross consumer surplus in this market. If there 
are two active networks, then gross consumer surplus is smaller than in the above 
case, and since no consumer can get negative utility in any Nash equilibrium, the 
profit of the firm is strictly smaller than what it could obtain by establishing only 
one network. The assumption that consumers can implicitly coordinate their choices 
in this case ultimately hurts them because the firm can extract all the potential con-
sumer surplus in the market.
B. Two Types of Consumers on Both sides
In our model, there are several reasons to expect that a monopolist network pro-
vider always wants to establish only one network, even when consumers are hetero-
geneous. One is that the amount of revenue a monopolist can get from a consumer 
cannot be higher than the utility this consumer obtains from joining the network, and 
the utility of every consumer is larger if all consumers are on the same network than 
if they are divided into two networks. Second, our assumption that consumers have 
at least some ability to coordinate their choices when it is in their best interest to do 
so excludes the possibility that the monopolist establishes an expensive network for 
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relatively high valuation consumers and a cheap one for low valuation consumers, 
since, then, all consumers would just choose the cheaper network. In this subsection, 
we show by example that, despite these arguments, a monopolist can find it feasible 
and profitable to divide the consumers and operate two active networks. We show 
that in this case, one network is cheaper and larger on one side of the market, while 
the other network is cheaper and larger on the other side. In the next subsection, we 
show that these qualitative features of equilibria with two networks generalize to any 
distribution of consumer preferences.
In the remainder of this subsection, we assume that there are only two types of 
consumers on each side, and consumers have linear utility functions.
Assume that gi
j 1n2 5 uij · n 5 j 5 1, 2 and i [ 30, 14 . Also assume that ui1 5 ui2 5 h 
5i [ 30, a 4 and ui1 5 ui2 5 l 5i [ 1a, 14 ,  where l , h and a [ 10, 12 .
On each side, a fraction a of the consumers have a reservation value h, which is 
higher than l, the reservation value of the rest of the consumers. We refer to consum-
ers with reservation value h as high types, and consumers with reservation value l 
as low types.23
It is possible to prove that, in this context, a monopolist will never want to estab-
lish more than two networks. Below, we concentrate on the choice between estab-
lishing one versus two networks.
As a first step, we characterize the set of coalition perfect equilibria when the firm 
can only establish one network.
Define the following cutoff points:
(1)  t1 K 2a 2 1
 a
(2)  t2 K      .2 2 a
Notice that if a $ 1/2, then 0 # t1 # t2 # 1, while if a # 1/2, then t1 # 0 # t2 # 1/2. 
Also, notice that both t1 and t2 are strictly increasing in a.
THEOREM 3: Assume the monopolist can only establish one network. for every 
coalition perfect equilibrium,  the following holds:
 (i) If l/h , max 50, t16, then p1 5 p2 5 ah, and only the high types on both sides 
join the network.
 (ii) If l/h [ 1max50, t16, t22 , then there is j [ 51, 26 such that p j 5 al,  and on side j, 
all consumers join the network,  while p2j 5 h and on side 2j,  only high types 
join the network.
23 Note that high and low type only refer to the reservation value of consumers and not to their quality in terms 
of how desirable a consumer’s presence is on the network for consumers on the other side. In our model, all con-
sumers are ex ante identical in terms of this external effect.
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 (iii) If l/h [ 1t2, 12 , then p1 5 p2 5 l, and all consumers on both sides join the 
network.
finally,  if l/h 5 t1, there are coalition perfect equilibria of both type 1 and type 2 
above. similarly,  if l/h 5 t2, then there are coalition perfect equilibria of both type 
2 and type 3 above.
The coalition perfect equilibrium is almost always unique, but depends on the 
values of parameters a, h, and l. If l is relatively low and a is high, then the monop-
olist targets only the high type consumers and charges a high price on both sides. 
If l is relatively high and a is small, then the monopolist targets all consumers and 
charges a low price on both sides. In cases in between, the monopolist might target 
all consumers on one side and only the high types on the other side, by charging 
a low and a high price. These results are both intuitive and in accordance with 
classic results from the literature on multi-product pricing with heterogeneous 
consumers.
Note that if a , 1/2, then there is no coalition perfect equilibrium in which the 
monopolist charges a high price on both sides of the market, targeting only high 
types. Charging a high price on one side of the market has to be accompanied by 
charging a low price on the other side. The reason is that there must be enough con-
sumers of the other side of the network for high types on the first side to be willing to 
pay the high price. The monopolist therefore cannot extract a high level of consumer 
surplus from both sides of the market simultaneously.
Assume now that the monopolist can choose to establish two networks. The next 
theorem shows that for a range of parameter values, in every coalition perfect equi-
librium the monopolist chooses to operate two networks, and high- and low-type 
consumers on the same side of the market choose different networks.
Define the following cutoff points:
(3)  z1  K  4a 2 1
a 11 2 2a 2
(4)  z2 K       . 1 2 a
Notice that if a [ 30, 1 2 !2–/24 ,  then t1 # z1 # t2 # z2,  and both z1 and z2 are 
strictly increasing in a.
THEOREM 4: If a [ 10, 1 2 !2–/22 and l/h [ 1max 50, z16, z22 ,  then the following 
hold for every coalition perfect equilibrium:
 (i) The monopolist establishes two networks.
 (ii) There is j [ 51, 26 such that all high types on side j and all low types on side 
2j join network 1,  while all low types on side j and all high types on side 2j 
join network 2. The prices are p1
j 5 p2
2j 5 h 11 2 2a 2 1 al and p2j 5 p12j 5 al.
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Note that this range of parameter 
values cuts into two regions. One, 
where a monopolist with one network 
would target all consumers on both 
sides, and another where he would tar-
get only high type consumers on one 
side and all consumers on the other.
By establishing two networks and 
pricing them differently, the monopolist 
implements a form of second-degree 
price discrimination. In particular, if 
the proportion of high types is suffi-
ciently low then, even if reservation values are unobservable, the monopolist can 
separate the low types and the high types on each side by charging a high price on 
side 1 and a low price on side 2 in one network and doing the opposite on the other 
network. An appropriate choice of prices results in low-type consumers choosing 
networks that are relatively cheap for them and high-type consumers choosing the 
ones that are relatively expensive for them. In equilibrium, the two networks, despite 
being physically equivalent, end up being of different quality. In our framework, the 
quality of a network for a consumer is determined by how many consumers join the 
network on the other side of the market. If the majority of consumers on each side 
of the market are low types, then when all low-type consumers on side 1 join one 
network, that network becomes higher quality for side 2 consumers. Similarly, when 
all low-type consumers on side 2 join one network, that network becomes higher 
quality for side 1 consumers. Since in the above equilibria the low type consumers 
join different networks, one network ends up being high quality for side 1 consum-
ers, and the other for side 2 consumers. High-type consumers have a higher willing-
ness to pay for quality and therefore are willing to join the networks that are more 
expensive for them.
The result that in equilibrium the monopolist separates consumers on the same 
side by offering them two products that have different prices and qualities is stan-
dard in the adverse selection literature.24 What is special to this model is that the 
two networks are ex ante identical and that product differentiation is endogenous. 
The quality of a network is determined in equilibrium by the network choices of the 
consumers, which are driven by the prices of the networks.
The reason the monopolist might be better off using this type of price discrimina-
tion is that it can extract a large consumer surplus from high type consumers on both 
sides of the market simultaneously, something that it cannot achieve by operating 
only one network (see Figure 1 for an illustration).
In the above equilibrium, the firm sacrifices some gross consumer surplus (it 
would be socially efficient if all participating consumers were on the same network) 
in order to be able to extract a high share of the surplus from consumers with high 
reservation values on both sides of the market.
24 See Michael Mussa and Sherwin Rosen (1978) and Eric Maskin and John Riley (1984).
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Despite this, the aggregate social welfare in the situation in which the monopo-
list is not allowed to operate multiple networks can be either higher or lower than 
in the situation in which it can only operate one. If l/h [ 1t2, z22 , then a monopolist 
operating only one network charges prices 1l, l 2 and all consumers join the network. 
This generates a higher aggregate surplus than if the monopolist can operate two 
networks, because the same set of consumers participate in the market in both cases, 
but more surplus is generated if they all join the same network. As far as consumer 
surplus is concerned, high types are better off if the monopolist can run only one net-
work and low types are indifferent (they get zero utility in both cases). On the other 
hand, if l/h [ 1z1, t22 , then, being restricted to operate one network, the monopolist 
sets a price of h on one side and la on the other. Only high types join the network 
on the first side, as well as all consumers from the other side. In this case, high-type 
consumers are better off if the monopolist can operate two networks and low-types 
are again indifferent. Furthermore, simple calculations show that aggregate social 
surplus is higher in the case of two networks.
Equilibrium prices and quantities have to satisfy the “incentive compatibility con-
straints” that require that a high-type consumer should prefer the more expensive net-
work, while a low-type consumer should prefer the cheaper network. Furthermore, 
since staying out of the market is an option to every consumer, consumers have to 
get nonnegative utility in equilibrium—a “participation constraint.” One feature of 
the above result, which is consistent with the literature on adverse selection, is that 
the incentive-compatibility constraints for the high types and the participation con-
straints for the low types are binding in equilibrium.
C. general results
In the example presented in the previous subsection, equilibrium with two net-
works had a particular asymmetric structure. The next result establishes that this 
feature generalizes to any distribution of consumer preferences for which incremen-
tal utilities from increasing the number of consumers on the other side of the net-
work are bounded by a positive constant.
THEOREM 5: Assume A1 holds. If a monopolist establishes two active networks 
in a coalition perfect equilibrium,  then one is 1weakly 2 cheaper and larger on one 
side of the market,  while the other is 1weakly 2 cheaper and larger on the other side. 
Moreover,  these relationships are strict at least on one side.
The intuition behind the result is that when consumers have some ability to 
coordinate their choices, when it is in their interest to do so, the monopolist can-
not establish two active networks such that one is cheaper on both sides. If he did 
so, all consumers would just choose the cheaper network. Moreover, it is never in 
the interest of the monopolist to establish two networks and set the same prices, 
since the same consumers who join the two networks would be willing to pay 
higher prices if all of them were on the same network. The claim on equilib-
rium market shares follows from the asymmetry of prices and the rationality of 
consumers.
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The above result can be strengthened if we assume that consumers’ utility func-
tions are (weakly) convex.
THEOREM 6: Assume that the utility functions of all consumers are convex. If 
a monopolist establishes two active networks in a coalition perfect equilibrium, 
then one is strictly cheaper and larger on one side of the market, while the other is 
strictly cheaper and larger on the other side.
Whether a monopolist wants to establish multiple networks depends on the disper-
sion of consumer types. A necessary and sufficient condition is hard to characterize 
analytically, since the constraints implied by coalitional rationalizability can be very 
complicated if there are many consumer types. But for (weakly) convex utility func-
tions, it is possible to provide a simple, necessary condition, in the form of an upper 
bound on the ratio of utilities of any two consumers on the same side, from join-
ing the same network. In particular, if this ratio is always smaller than a particular 
threshold level (roughly 5.8), then the monopolist establishes only one network in 
equilibrium. We note that for concave utility functions, a smaller amount of hetero-
geneity might be enough for the existence of multiple networks in equilibrium. The 
intuition is that, if utility functions are more concave, then dividing consumers into 
different networks results in a smaller efficiency loss.
Define the dispersion of utility levels on side j to be supi, i9[ 30, 14 , n[ 10, 14 gij 1n2/gji91n2 .
THEOREM 7: If consumers’ utility functions are convex, and the dispersion of 
utility levels on each sides of the market is less than 3 1 2!2–, then the monopolist 
establishes only one active network in every coalition perfect equilibrium.
The key point in the proof is to show that, under the conditions of the theo-
rem, establishing one network and charging prices equal to the lowest reservation 
value on each side is always more profitable than establishing two active networks. 
Establishing two active networks implies sacrificing some consumer surplus. 
Therefore, it can only be profitable if there are some consumers with sufficiently 
high reservation values relative to others.
We note that the results of this section carry over to the case when consumers can 
join multiple networks at the same time (multi-homing).25 Furthermore, the latter 
framework is formally equivalent to one in which the monopolist operates only one 
network but can sell restricted access to the network. Therefore, our results also imply 
that a monopolist in a two-sided market might want to sell limited access to consum-
ers at a lower price and full access at a higher price on both sides of the market. This 
can occur in contexts in which it is technically feasible for the firm to control which 
transactions/matches can be made on the network, and if there is enough heterogeneity 
among consumers in how much they value the network effect.
25 See Section VIB for a discussion.
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V. Competing Network Providers
In this section, we derive results for the case of competing network providers that 
are parallel to the theorems provided in the previous section for the case of a monop-
olist provider. In particular, multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in coalition 
perfect equilibrium, but only if there is sufficient heterogeneity among consumers.
A. Homogenous Consumers
In this subsection, we assume that there are two platform providers and that consum-
ers on the same side have the same reservation value: u1 on side 1 and u2 on side 2.
In Theorem 8, we show that either one firm attracts all consumers on both sides 
of the market, or the two firms charge the same prices and split the market equally, 
with each of them attracting half of the consumers on both sides.26 In both these con-
figurations, the two firms make zero profits. Just like in the monopoly case, multiple 
asymmetric networks cannot coexist in equilibrium if consumers are homogenous.
THEOREM 8: If all consumers on the same side have the same reservation value, 
then there can be two types of coalition perfect equilibria in the duopoly game:
 (i) All consumers join the same network k, which is priced such that pk
1 5 2pk
2;
 (ii) Both networks attract half of the consumers on both sides, and prices are such 
that p1
1 5 p2
1 5 2p12 5 2p22.
The theorem reestablishes the zero-profit result in a symmetric Bertrand duopoly 
game for markets with network externalities. The intuition is that slightly undercut-
ting the competitor’s price on both sides results in stealing the whole market, since 
then we assume that consumers coordinate on the cheaper network. However, as 
opposed to a market with no network externalities, equilibrium prices are not neces-
sarily equal to the marginal cost (assumed to be zero). It is possible that consumers 
on one side of the market are subsidized, and consumers on the other side pay a price 
that is equal to the subsidy received by the former group.
One feature that is common to all equilibria is that there is full consumer partici-
pation on both sides. If equilibrium prices are zero on both sides, then this follows 
from the assumption that consumers have some ability to limit coordination failures. 
If consumers do not join any network, each of them receives zero utility. If all con-
sumers join some network instead, each of them expects a positive payoff, even if 
perfect coordination on just one network is not guaranteed. On the other hand, in 
the case where one side of the market is subsidized, then joining a network is clearly 
dominant for consumers on the subsidized side. Suppose now that at the same time 
not all consumers join the networks on the side where price is positive. Then one of 
26 It can be shown that imposing the stronger concept of extensive form coalition proof Nash equilibrium 
eliminates the second type of equilibrium. Therefore, when consumers are homogenous, all consumers join the 
same network in every extensive form coalition proof Nash equilibrium of the duopoly game.
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the networks could deviate profitably by slightly undercutting the market price on 
both sides and guarantee that all consumers from both sides (including the one with 
positive price) join its network, contradicting that the market is in equilibrium.
The next result establishes that if the reservation values on the two sides are not 
equal, then in every equilibrium the side with the smaller reservation value has to 
be subsidized.27
THEOREM 9: If u j , u2j for j [ 51, 26 ,  and in a coalition perfect equilibrium some 
consumers join network k, then pk
j [ 32u2j, u j 2 u2j 4 .
This result is not a consequence of coalitional rationalizability, but comes from 
the restrictions that “divide and conquer” strategies put on any subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium.28 If the market price is positive on the side with the low reser-
vation value, then it is relatively cheap to steal consumers on that side, and then a 
higher price can be charged on the side with the high reservation value.
It is straightforward to use Theorems 8 and 9 to characterize the set of coalition 
perfect equilibria for the case when utility functions are linear.
CLAIM 1: Let gi
j 1n 2j 2 5 n 2ju j 5 j 5 1, 2 and i [ 30, 14 . Then the following holds:
 (i) If u j # 2u2j 5 j 5 1, 2,  then two types of coalition perfect equilibria exist:
	 •	 1monopoly equilibria with zero profits 2 all consumers join the same network 
k,  pk
1 5 2pk
2, and uj , u2j implies pk
j # uj 2 u2j;
	 •	 1symmetric equilibria with zero profits 2 half of the consumers join each net-
work on both sides,  p1
1 5 p2
1 5 2p1
2 5 2p2
2, and uj , u2j implies pk
j # uj 2 
u2j.
 (ii) If u j . 2u2j for some j [ 51, 26,  then only one type of coalition perfect equi-
librium exists. 1Monopoly equilibria with zero profits 2 all consumers join the 
same network k,  pk
1 5 2pk
2, and pk
j [ 32u2j, u j 2 u2j 4 .
This linear and homogeneous specification is the same one considered in Caillaud 
and Jullien (2001). Therefore, Claim 1 gives an opportunity for a direct comparison 
of the results in a special setting. By assuming monotonicity of the demand func-
tion, Caillaud and Jullien obtain the same set of equilibria with two active firms. 
Their refinement, however, selects a larger set of equilibria with one active firm, 
including equilibria in which the active firm gets positive profits. Furthermore, full 
27 This asymmetric price structure, which entails one side being subsidized and the other being charged a posi-
tive price, is extremely common in two-sided markets. For a list of examples, see Rochet and Tirole (2003).
28 The terminology “divide and conquer strategies” was introduced by Innes and Sexton (1993). Jullien (2001) 
and Caillaud and Jullien (2001) investigate these strategies in the context of price competition in two-sided mar-
kets. The main idea is that if a firm charges a sufficiently low (negative) price compared to its rival on one side 
of the market, it can make its network a dominant choice for consumers on that side. Then it can charge a high 
price on the other side of the market and still make sure that consumers join its network on that side. Despite the 
existence of these strategies, there typically is still a severe multiplicity of SPNE.
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 participation is an extra assumption in their model, while it is implied by the same 
assumption (coalitional rationality) as the rest of the results in our model.
B. Asymmetric networks with Heterogeneous Consumers: An Example
Below, we show that just like in the monopoly case, multiple asymmetric net-
works can emerge in equilibrium if there are two competing network providers. One 
interesting feature of this example is that the firms have positive profits in Bertrand 
competition, despite the assumption that consumers are coalitionally rational (which 
implies that each firm could “steal” all of the consumers from another firm by 
slightly undercutting its rival’s prices on both sides of the market).
Consider the following specification. There are two firms in the market. All con-
sumers have linear utility functions. Furthermore,  on both sides of the market con-
sumers’ reservation values are distributed as follows:
	 • A mass of consumers with measure 0.4 have reservation value 2.55 1I types 2 ;
	 • A mass of consumers with measure 0.15 have reservation value 0.51 1II 
types 2 ;
	 • A mass of consumers with measure 0.1 have reservation value 0.46 1III types 2;
	 • A mass of consumers with measure 0.35 have reservation value 0.15 1IV 
types 2 .
CLAIM 2: In the above game,  there exists a coalition perfect equilibrium in which 
one firm charges a price of 0.31 on side 1 and 20.2 on side 2, while the other firm 
charges 20.2 on side 1 and 0.31 on side 2. All type I consumers on side 1 and type 
II–IV consumers on side 2 join the first firm,  while all type I consumers on side 2 
and type II–IV consumers on side 1 join the second firm.
Note that in this profile, both firms get a profit of 0.31 3 0.4 2 0.2 3 0.6 5 0.04, 
which is strictly positive. The firms charge different prices, and consumers on the 
same side of the market with different reservation values end up paying different 
prices for the market good, despite the fact that reservation prices are private infor-
mation of the consumers.
Every consumer on both sides of the market joins some network. Type I consum-
ers on both sides of the market pay a registration fee of 0.31 for joining a network, 
and in equilibrium, they face a measure of 0.6 consumers from the other side of the 
market. All other consumers on both sides of the market are subsidized. They pay a 
registration fee of 20.2. In the equilibrium, they face only a measure of 0.4 consum-
ers from the other side of the market.
This equilibrium structure is similar to the equilibria in the previous section, in 
which the monopolist achieved price discrimination by operating two networks. In 
particular, one network is cheaper on one side of the market, while the other one is 
cheaper on the other side of the market. A larger fraction of consumers, those hav-
ing relatively low reservation values, join the cheap network side, which makes it 
worthwhile for the remaining, high reservation value consumers to join the expen-
sive network side.
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The reason why competition does not drive profits down to zero in the above 
example is that, with heterogeneous consumers, deviation strategies based on 
undercutting, while effective, are not necessarily profitable. For example, if 
firm 2 announces slightly cheaper prices than the equilibrium prices of firm 1, 
then types I–III from side 1 and all consumers from side 2 join its network. But 
the highest profit firm 2 can achieve this way is strictly smaller than the equilib-
rium profit of firm 1. The reason is that the proposed undercutting increases the 
number of consumers joining the network by a larger amount on the side where 
the price is negative.
The same intuition applies to so-called “divide and conquer” type strategies. A firm 
can lower its price so that it makes it a dominant choice for some type of  consumers 
to join its network, and then it can charge a high price on the other side of the market 
and still make sure that some consumers join its network on that side as well. But if 
consumers are heterogeneous, then the proportion of consumers who are willing to 
pay the increased price on the latter side might be too low to compensate for the costs 
associated with lowering the price (increasing the subsidy) on the first side.
C. general results
In this subsection, we show that results similar to those in Section IVC can be 
established for the case of competing network providers as well. The first theorem 
establishes that for any distribution of consumer preferences, in any equilibrium 
with positive profits, the two competing networks have to be asymmetric (prices and 
market shares are different at least on one side), with the particular structure that 
one network is cheaper and larger on one side, and the other network is cheaper and 
larger on the other side. Unlike in the monopoly case, Assumption A1 is not needed 
to establish this result.
THEOREM 10: suppose there are two firms in the market. If in a coalition per-
fect equilibrium the profit of at least one firm is positive,  then one firm’s network 
is 1weakly 2 cheaper and larger on one side of the market,  while the other firm’s 
network is 1weakly 2 cheaper and larger on the other side. Moreover,  these relation-
ships are strict at least on one side.
The reasons why equilibria with positive profit in the duopoly case and equilibria 
involving multiple networks in the monopoly case have the same asymmetric fea-
ture are not exactly the same. In both cases it cannot be that one network is cheaper 
on both sides of the market, since all consumers would choose this network. In the 
monopoly case, it is never in the interest of the firm to establish two networks that 
are priced equally, since that would just split consumers into two networks, generat-
ing less consumer surplus. In the duopoly case, there cannot be a coalition perfect 
equilibrium with positive profits and equally priced networks because of the usual 
Bertrand competition undercutting argument.
As in the case of a monopolist network provider, consumers need to be het-
erogeneous enough for the coexistence of two asymmetric active networks. The 
next theorem provides a necessary condition for multiple asymmetric networks 
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to coexist in coalition perfect equilibrium. Theorem 10 implies that this is also a 
necessary condition for the existence of a coalition perfect equilibrium in which 
at least one firm obtains a positive profit. The condition is expressed in terms of 
the ratio of the highest and lowest reservation value for consumers on the same 
side. This ratio needs to be higher than a certain threshold, at least on one side. 
Note that this is a stronger requirement than the one that the dispersion of utili-
ties (as defined in IVC) is higher than the same threshold on at least one side of 
the market.
THEOREM 11: suppose there are two firms in the market. If consumers’ utility 
functions are convex,  and the ratio of reservation values of any two consumers 
on the same side is less than 4/3, then there can be two types of coalition perfect 
equilibria:
 (i) There is only one active network.
 (ii) There are two active networks,  priced the same and attracting the same num-
ber of consumers on both sides of the market.
VI. Discussion
In this section, we discuss how the results of the paper would be affected by 
changing different assumptions we made in the model.
A. Positive Marginal Cost
If firms face a positive constant marginal cost, all the qualitative results still hold, 
with one exception. If the marginal cost is higher than a certain threshold, then, even 
if every consumer’s reservation value is still higher than the marginal cost, it is not 
guaranteed that consumers can coordinate on entering the market. If marginal costs 
are high, then the average price charged on consumers is high, and ex ante coordina-
tion to join some network becomes harder.
B. Multi-homing
In some two-sided markets, network choices are naturally mutually exclusive, at 
least over a given period of time. For example, people looking for a date can only be 
in one entertainment facility at a time. In other contexts, consumers can join mul-
tiple platforms, which is called multi-homing in the literature.
The main conclusions of the paper remain valid if we allow for multi-homing. In 
particular, there can be multiple active networks in coalition perfect equilibrium that 
are not equally priced, provided that one network is cheaper and larger on one side 
of the market and the other network is cheaper and larger on the other side. In fact, 
if multi-homing is possible, then it is more likely that a monopolist finds it profitable 
to operate two networks rather than one. The intuition is that the monopolist can still 
set prices such that low reservation value consumers only join the network that is 
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cheap on their side, but if multi-homing is allowed then high reservation value con-
sumers on one of the two sides join both networks. This increases the monopolist’s 
revenue, which makes dividing consumers into two networks more attractive, rela-
tive to establishing only one network.
C. Conflict of Interest among Consumers on the same side
The assumption that a consumer’s utility is not affected by the number of consum-
ers from the same side of the market who join the same platform can be restrictive 
in a variety of contexts. If the networks are matchmaking services or auction sites, 
then people on the same side of the market might compete for the same transactions. 
In other contexts, transactions are nonrival goods, validating our assumption of no 
conflict of interest on the same side.
It is possible to partially relax the assumption of no conflict of interest on the same 
side and retain some of the results in this paper. An earlier version of this paper 
shows that the results concerning markets with small amounts of heterogeneity hold 
even if some conflict of interest is allowed among consumers on the same side.29 In 
particular, in this case, a monopolist always operates only one network in coalition 
perfect equilibrium, and there cannot be asymmetric active networks in duopoly 
competition either. In general, the existence of multiple networks in coalition perfect 
equilibrium becomes more likely if there is conflict of interest on the same side 
because the latter makes ex ante consumer coordination more difficult.
D. More than Two firms
With more than two firms operating on the market, the analysis of the price compe-
tition game becomes complicated and therefore is omitted from this paper. However, 
we note that there can exist coalition perfect equilibria with multiple asymmetric 
networks in the case of more than two firms. In fact, in general there is a wider range 
of coalition perfect equilibria. The reason is that coordination among consumers is 
more difficult if there are more than two firms, hence there are less restrictions that 
apply to consumer choices after various price announcements.
VII. Conclusions and Possible Extensions
This paper analyzes pricing decisions of firms and platform choices of consum-
ers in two-sided markets with network externalities, in a context where consumers 
are heterogeneous with respect to how much they care about the externality. We 
show that this type of heterogeneity can lead to asymmetric market structures, with 
multiple differently priced networks coexisting in the market. We provide necessary 
conditions for this to be possible, and we derive qualitative properties of prices and 
market shares in these equilibria. A natural next step for future research would be 
to allow for different types of heterogeneity among consumers on these  markets. 
29 Contact the authors for these extensions.
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Besides differences in preferences, consumers can be ex ante asymmetric with 
respect to the network externality they generate—their “attractiveness” to consum-
ers on the other side. They might also be heterogeneous with respect to the marginal 
cost their transactions generate on the platforms they join. Both of these features 
would introduce interesting adverse selection problems in our model, which might 
be important in some two-sided markets.
Appendix A: Coalitional Rationalizability
Some extra notation for the Appendix.
Let C1 and C2 denote the set of consumers on sides 1 and 2, and let C 5 C1 < C2. 
Let Ci
j denote consumer i on side j.
Let ci
j denote the action choice of Ci
j. The set of possible choices for a consumer is 5~, 1, … , k 6, where k is the number of networks established and ~ denotes the choice 
of not joining any network.
In the game with one firm, let pM denote the profit of the monopolist. In the 
duopoly game, let pk denote the profit of firm k (for k [ 51, 26).
Let s denote the set of strategies in the game. For every s [ s let pk 1s 2 , pkj1s 2 , 
nk
j1s 2 , and cij 1s 2 denote the realized nk, pk, pkj, nkj, and cij if profile s is played.
Below, we provide the formal definition for coalitionally rationalizable strategies 
in consumer subgames.
Consider a consumer subgame after any sequence of network choices and price 
announcement by the firms. Let sc denote the strategy space in the subgame, and 
let 1sc 2 i, j denote the set of strategies of consumer i on side j in this subgame. Let X 
denote the collection of nonempty product subsets of sc. For every j 5 1, 2 and i [ 30, 14 , let V2i, j be the set of probability distributions over sc2i, j . For every A [ X, let 
V2i, j 1A2 5 5v2i, j [ V2i, j : ea2i, j [ A2i, j v2i, j 1a2i, j 2 5 16. Finally, let uij 1si, j, v2j, i 2 denote 
the expected payoff of consumer i on side j in this subgame if he plays si, j and his 
conjecture on other consumers’ strategies is v2i, j [ V2i, j .
DEFINITION: B [ X is a supported restriction by J , C1 < C2 given A [ X if
 (i) Bi, j 5 Ai, j, 5 Ci
j o J,  and
 (ii) 5 Ci
j [ J, and v2i, j [ V2i, j 1A2 for which  E si, j [ Ai, j /Bi, j such that si, j [ 
Brj 1v2i, j 2 , it is the case that
 ui
j 1si, j , v2j, i2 ,  max  uij 1tij, t2j, i2 5 t2j, i such that t2j, i [ V2j, i 1B2 and tC/J 5vC/J. tij [ 1sc 2 i, j
The first condition above requires that only the strategies of those consumers who 
are members of the given coalition are restricted. The second condition requires that, 
for any player in the coalition, it holds that no matter what his beliefs are concerning 
the choices of consumers outside the coalition, his expected payoff is always strictly 
higher if the restriction is made (i.e., if every player in the coalition only chooses 
from among strategies in B) than if the restriction is not made, and it is rational for 
him to play some strategy outside the restriction.
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Let F1A2 denote the set of supported restrictions (by any coalition J). Define 
now the following sequence of sets iteratively. Let A0 5 sc. For k 5 1, 2, …,  let Ak 
5 >B[F1Ak212Ak21. The set of coalitionally rationalizable strategies in this consumer 
subgame is defined to be the intersection of this decreasing sequence of sets.
For a simple example, consider the following game specification. There are two 
firms, and for every j 5 1, 2 and i [ 30, 14 ,  it holds that gij 1n 2j 2 5 un 2j for some 
constant u . 0. Consider the subgame that follows price announcements p1
j 5 0 and 
p2
j 5 u/4 5 j 5 1, 2. In other words, network 1 is cheaper than network 2 on both 
sides of the market. In this subgame, joining network 1 is a supported restriction for 
the coalition of all players, since it yields payoff u to all consumers, while joining 
network 2 can only yield a payoff of at most 3u/4 and staying out yields 0. Therefore, 
the unique coalitionally rationalizable profile in this game is the one in which all 
consumers join network 1.
If consumers are heterogeneous, then the set of coalitionally rationalizable out-
comes in a subgame might be reached only after multiple rounds of agreements. 
Consider the following game specification. There are two firms, consumers have 
linear utility functions, ui1 5 1 i [ 30, 1/24 ,  ui1 5 1/2 i [ 11/2, 14 , and ui2 5 1 i [ 30, 14 . In 
other words, consumers on side 2 are homogeneous, while half of the consumers on 
side 1 have relatively low reservation values. Consider the subgame following price 
announcements p1
1 5 0.4, p1
2 5 0.8, and p21 5 0.8, p22 5 0.4. Initially, there is no 
supported restriction for the coalition of all consumers. Consumers would prefer to 
coordinate their network choices, but coordinating on network 1 is better for side 1 
consumers, while coordinating on network 2 is better for side 2 consumers. However, 
note that joining network 2 is not rationalizable for any consumer Ci
1 for i [ 11/2, 14 . 
Once it is established that players Ci
1 for i [ 11/2, 14 only consider the strategies, not 
joining any network or joining network 1, it is a supported restriction for the coali-
tion of all consumers to join network 1.
Appendix B: Proofs
PROOF OF THEOREM 1:
Using the fact that consumers’ utility functions are continuous in the price of 
networks they join, it is straightforward to establish that there exists a Nash equi-
librium with one network in which the monopolist’s profit is higher than in any 
other Nash equilibrium with one network. Let s be such a Nash equilibrium. Given 
that gi
j is strictly increasing for every j [ 51, 26 and i [ 30, 14 , pM 1s 2 . 0. This 
implies that in s at least on one side of the market the monopolist charges a strictly 
positive price and has a strictly positive market share. Let Cˆ j 1s 2 5 5Cij : cij 1s 2 Z ~6 
for j 5 1, 2. Then for Ci
j [ Cˆ j 1s 2 and n j [ 30, 14 , it holds that gij 1n 2j 1s 2 2 2 p j 1s 2 
$ 0. Then for every e . 0 and Ci
j [ Cˆ j 1s 2 , it holds that gij 1n12j 1s 2 2 2 p j 1s 2 1 e 
. 0, which implies that if the monopolist establishes one network and sets prices 1 p11s 2 2 e, p2 1s 2 2 e 2 ,  in the resulting subgame joining the network is a supported 
restriction for Cˆ11s 2 < Cˆ2 1s 2 .
We use this result to show that the monopolist can get a profit arbitrarily close to 
pM 1s 2 given that consumers are coalitionally rational. If pj 1s 2 $ 0 for j 5 1, 2,  then the 
firm can get a profit arbitrarily close to pM 1s 2 by establishing one network and  charging 
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prices 1 p11s 2 2 e, p2 1s 2 2 e 2 for small enough e . 0. If pj 1s 2 . 0 and p2j 1s 2 , 0, it has 
to be the case that nj 1s 2 . 0 and n 2j 1s 2 5 1. Then, by establishing one network and 
setting prices 1 p11s 2 2 e, p2 1s 2 2 e 2 , the monopolist gets market shares nj $ nj 1s 2 and 
n 2j 5 1, and again its profit can be arbitrarily close to pM 1s 2 .
The above implies that the monopolist’s profit in any coalition perfect equilibrium 
cannot be strictly lower than pM 1s 2 .
PROOF OF THEOREM 2:
It is easy to check that if the conditions of the theorem hold, then in the maxi-
mum profit Nash equilibrium with one network pj 5 uj 1  j [ 51, 262 . Consider now a 
Nash equilibrium in which there are two networks and there is a positive fraction of 
consumers at both of them. Then for a positive fraction of consumers, it holds that 
the number of consumers on the other side of the same network is strictly less than 
1. Without loss of generality, assume that n1
1 . 0 and n1
2 , 1 in the equilibrium at 
hand. Then p1
1 , u1; otherwise consumers on side 1 would prefer not joining any 
network to joining network 1. Furthermore, nk
j . 0 implies pk
j # uj for j, k [ 51, 26, 
again because otherwise consumers on side j would prefer not joining any network 
to joining network k. The above imply that pM , u
1 1 u2 in the Nash equilibrium at 
hand, so by Theorem 1 it cannot be a coalition perfect equilibrium.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3:
In the subgame following price announcements 1l, l 2 , every consumer joining the 
network is a coalitionally rationalizable Nash equilibrium, which gives a profit of 
2l to the monopolist. In the subgame following price announcements 1al, h 2 , it is a 
coalitionally rationalizable Nash equilibrium if all consumers from side 1 and high 
types from side 2 join the network, which gives a profit of a 1h 1 l 2 to the monopolist. 
In the subgame following price announcements 1ah, ah 2 , it is a coalitionally rational-
izable Nash equilibrium if high types from both sides join the network, which gives 
a profit of 2a2h to the monopolist.
Suppose 2a2h . al 1 ah. Since a . 0 , this is equivalent to 12a 2 12h . l. The 
latter implies a2h . l since a2h 2 12a 2 12h 5 1a 2 122h . 0. Therefore 12a 2 12h 
. l implies that 2a2h . max 12l, ah 1 al 2 .
Suppose now that ah 1 al , 2l. It is equivalent to l . 1a/ 12 2 a 2 2h. The latter 
implies l . a2h since 1a/ 12 2 a 2 2h 2 a2h 5 ah 3 11 2 2a 1 a22/ 12 2 a 2 4 . 0. Therefore 
2a2h , 2l. This establishes that if l . 1a/ 12 2 a 2 2h, then 2l . max 12a2h, ah 1 
al 2 .
Note that 12a 2 12h , 1a/ 12 2 a 2 2h. If l [ 1 12a 2 12h, 1a/ 12 2 a 2 2h 2 , then 2a2h 
, al 1 ah and ah 1 al . 2l and therefore ah 1 al . max 12l, 2a2h 2 .
It is straightforward to show that there is no Nash equilibrium in which pM is 
larger than max 12l, 2a2h, a 1h 1 l 2 2 . Then the theorem follows from the above results 
and Theorem 1.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4:
In any coalition perfect equilibrium, in the subgame following the firm establish-
ing two networks and setting prices, p1
1 5 p2
2 5 la 2 e,  p1
2 5 p2
1 5 la 1 11 2 a 2h 2 
2e (e . 0), it has to hold that ci
1 5 2,  ci
2 5 1 5 i [ 30, a 4 and ci1 5 1,  ci2 5 2 5 i [ 1a, 14 . 
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To see this, define A , s such that A 5 3i[ 30, 14 , j51, 2 Aij , Aij K 5~, 1, 26 5 i [ 30, a 4 , j 
5 1, 2, Ai
1 K 5~, 16 5 i [ 1a, 14 , and Ai2 K 5~, 26 5 i [ 1a, 14 . Also define B , s such 
that B 5 3i[ 30, 14 , j51, 2 Bij and Bi1 K 526 5 i [ 30, a 4 , Bi2 K 516 5 i [ 30, a 4 , j 5 1, 2, Bi1 
K 516 5 i [ 1a, 14 , and Bi2 K 526 5 i [ 1a, 14 . First note that for any i [ 30, 14 and j [ 51, 26, Aij 3 s21, i is a supported restriction by Cij given s,  since strategies in sij/Aij 
are never best responses for consumer i on side j. Next, B is a supported restriction 
given A by C1 < C2 since it gives the best possible payoff to every consumer in this 
subgame, given A . Therefore ci
1 5 2,  ci
2 5 1 5 i [ 30, a 4 and ci1 5 1,  ci2 5 2 5 i [ 1a, 14 is the only coalitionally rationalizable strategy in the above subgame.
Since e can be arbitrarily small positive, the above establishes that if s [ s is a 
coalition perfect equilibrium, then pM 1s 2 $ 2 1la 1 11 2 a 2ah 2 K p*.
Suppose there exists a coalition perfect equilibrium s [ s such that pM 1s 2 . p*.
First suppose that the number of networks established by the firm in s is 1. If l 
[ 1 14a 2 12h, 1a/ 12 2 a 2 2h 2 ,  then by Theorem 3, pM 1s 2 # 1l 1 h 2 a. But for l . 14a 2 12h, it holds that 1l 1 h 2 a , 2 1la 1 11 2 a 2 ah 2 K p*, a contradiction. If l 
[ 1 1a/ 12 2 a 2 2h, 3a 11 2 2a 2/ 11 2 a 2 4 h 2 , then by Theorem 2 pM 1s 2 # 2l. But l , 3a 11 2 2a 2/ 11 2 a 2 4 h implies 2l , 2 1la 1 11 2 a 2 ah 2 K p*, a contradiction. Next, 
suppose that the number of networks established by the firm in s is 2. It cannot be 
that nk
j1s 2 5 0 for some j 5 1, 2 and k 5 1, 2 since then either nk2j1s 2 5 0 or pk2j 1s 2 
# 0 (otherwise consumers choosing network k in s would get negative utility, con-
tradicting that s is a Nash equilibrium). In either case, pM 1s 2 is smaller or equal to 
the supremum of profits attainable by a strategy in which the monopolist operates 
only one network. Then, as established above, pM 1s 2 , p*. Therefore nkj1s 2 . 0 5 
j 5 1, 2 and k 5 1, 2.
Let Hj and Lj denote high and low type consumers on side j. Let Xk
j denote the 
consumers on side j who join network k in s.
First we establish that it cannot be that for some j 5 1, 2 both X1
j > Lj 5 ~ and 
X2
j > Lj 5 ~. If X1j > Lj 5 ~ and X2j > Lj 5 ~ 5 j 5 1, 2, then pM 1s 2 , 2a2h , p*. 
Otherwise, w.l.o.g. assume X1
2 > L2 5 ~ and X22 > L2 5 ~ and X21 > L1 Z ~. Let pˆ1 
5 max 10, p111s 2 3n12 1s 2 1 n22 1s 2 4/n22 1s 2 2 and pˆ2 5 max 10, p22 1s 2 2 . Consider a devia-
tion s9 by the firm such that the firm establishes one network and sets prices p11s92 
5 pˆ1 2 e and p2 1s92 5 pˆ2 2 e. In the subgame following the above prices, it is a sup-
ported restriction for X1
1 < X2
1 < X1
2 < X2
2 (note that X2
1 > L1 Z ~ and therefore p111s 2 
# ln2
2) to choose 1. Therefore, deviating this way the firm can get a profit arbitrarily 
close to p9 K pˆ1 1n111s 2 1 n211s 2 2 1 pˆ2 1n12 1s 2 1 n22 1s 2 2 . Let pˆˆ1 5 max 10, p12 1s 2 3n12 1s 2 
1 n2
2 1s 2 4/n12 1s 62 and pˆˆ2 5 max 10, p12 1s 2 2 . Consider now deviation s0 by the firm such 
that one network is established, and priced such that p11s0 2 5 pˆˆ1 2 e and p2 1s0 2 5 pˆˆ2 
2 e. In the subgame following the above prices, it is a supported restriction for X2
1 
< X1
2 < X2
2 to choose 1. Therefore, deviating this way the firm can get a profit arbi-
trarily close to p0 K pˆˆ1 n211s 2 1 pˆˆ2 1n12 1s 2 1 n22 1s 2 2 . It is straightforward to verify that 
both p9 1 p0 . 2pM 1s 2 , and therefore at least one of the above deviations, yields 
higher profit than pM 1s 2 . And since nA 1s92 5 1 and nA 1s0 2 5 1, it holds that p9 , p* 
and p0 , p*, and therefore pM 1s 2 , p*.
Next, we establish that it cannot be that for some j 5 1, 2 both, and X1
j > Lj Z ~, 
and X2
j > Lj Z ~. If X1j > Lj Z ~, and X2j > Lj Z ~ 5 j 5 1, 2, then pkj1s 2 # lnk2j1s 2 5 k 
5 1, 2 and j 5 1, 2. Then pM 1s 2 , 2l , p*. Otherwise w.l.o.g. assume X11 > L1 Z ~, 
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X2
1 > L1 Z ~ and X12 > L2 Z ~. Then pM 1s 2 , 1h 1 l 2n111s 2n22 1s 2 1 2ln12 1s 2n211s 2 , 
since p1
11s 2 # ln22 1s 2 , p211s 2 # ln211s 2 , p12 1s 2 # ln111s 2 , and p22 1s 2 , hn211s 2 . Note that 1h 1 l 2n22 1s 2 , 1h 1 l 2a , p*, and therefore 1h 1 l 2n22 1s 2 , 1h 1 l 2n111s 2n22 1s 2 1 
2ln1
2 1s 2n211s 2 . This implies 1h 1 l 2n22 1s 2 , 2ln12 1s 2 , 2l. Furthermore, 2l , p* and 
therefore 2l , 1h 1 l 2n111s 2n22 1s 2 1 2ln12 1s 2n211s 2 . This implies 2l 11 2 n12 1s 2n211s 2 2 
, 1h 1 l 2n111s 2n22 1s 2 , which implies 2ln111s 2 , 1h 1 l 2n111s 2n22 1s 2 , which implies 2l 
, 1h 1 l 2n22 1s 2 , a contradiction.
Finally, we establish that it cannot be that for some k 5 1, 2 both Xk
1 > L1 Z ~ 
and Xk
2 > L2 Z ~. Suppose otherwise. Then, as established above, X12k > L1 5 ~ and 
X22k > L
2 5 ~, but X12k Z ~ and X22k Z ~. This implies nk2j1s 2 l 2 pkj1s 2 $ n22kj 1s 2 l 2 
pj2k 1s 2 5 j 5 1, 2 and nk2j1s 2h 2 pkj1s 2 # n22kj 1s 2h 2 pj2k 1s 2 5 j 5 1, 2, which implies 
pk
j1s 2 # pj2k 1s 2 5 j 5 1, 2. Then pkj1s 2 5 pj2k 1s 2 for some j 5 1, 2. Furthermore, pkj1s 2 
# nk
2j1s 2 l , l. Then it is straightforward to establish that one of the following devia-
tions are profitable for the firm for small enough e: either establishing one network 
and setting prices p 5 1l 2 e, l 2 e 2 , or establishing one network and setting prices 
p 5 1p21k 1s 2 2 e, p22k 1s 2 2 e 2 .
The above implies E k [ 51, 26 such that Xk1 > H1 5 Xk1 and X22k > H2 5 Xk2. 
W.l.o.g. let k 5 1.
Note that p1
2 1s 2 # ln11 and p211s 2 # ln22 1s 2 since X12 > L2 Z ~, X21 > L1 Z ~ and 
by definition no consumer can get negative utility in any subgame if s is played. 
Then hn1
2 1s 2 2 p111s 2 $ hn22 1s 2 2 p211s 2 implies p111s 2 # ln22 1s 2 1 h 11 2 n22 1s 2 2 and 
hn2
11s 2 2 p22 1s 2 $ hn111s 2 2 p12 1s 2 implies p22 1s 2 # ln111s 2 1 h 11 2 n111s 2 2 . This 
establishes that
 pM 1s 2 # l 1n111s 2 1 n22 1s 2 2 1 h 1n111s 2 1 n22 1s 2 2 2n111s 2n22 1s 2 2 .
Note that 30 1l 1n111s 2 1 n22 1s 2 2 1 h 1n111s 2 1 n22 1s 2 2 2n111s 2n22 1s 2 2 2 4/0n11 5 h 1 l 2 
2hn2
2 1s 2 $ h 1 l 2 2ha . 0 (since the starting assumptions imply a , 1/2). Similarly, 
it holds that 0 3 1 1l 1n111s 2 1 n22 1s 2 2 1 h 1n111s 2 1 n22 1s 2 2 2n111s 2n22 1s 2 2 2 4/0n22 5 h 1 
l 2 2hn1
11s 2 $ h 1 l 2 2ha . 0. Therefore pM 1s 2 , l2a 1 h 12a 2 2a22 5 p* unless 
p1
2 1s 2 5 p211s 2 5 al, n12 1s 2 5 n211s 2 5 1 2 a, p111s 2 5 p22 1s 2 5 la 1 h 11 2 a 2 and 
n1
11s 2 5 n22 1s 2 5 a.
LEMMA 1: Consider a consumer subgame in which there are two networks, and 
prices are 1p11, p122 and 1p21, p222 . If pkj , pj2k 5 j 5 1, 2 for some k [ 51, 26 , then 2k is 
not a coalitionally rationalizable strategy in the subgame for any consumer. If also 
pk
j , ui
j 5 j [ 51, 26 and i [ 30, 14 , then k is the unique coalitionally rationalizable 
strategy in the subgame for all consumers.
PROOF OF LEMMA 1:
Let r2k be the set of consumers for whom 2k is rationalizable in the subgame. 
Then pk
j , pj2k 5 j 5 1, 2 implies that the restriction 5k 6 is supported by r2k in the 
subgame. The second claim in the lemma then follows from the fact that pk
j , ui
j 5 j 
[ 51, 26 and i [ 30, 14 implies r2k 5 C.
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LEMMA 2: Assume there is one firm in the market. suppose s is a coalition per-
fect equilibrium in which the monopolist establishes two networks. Then it cannot 
be that both n1
11s 2 p111s 2 1 n211s 2 p211s 2 # 0 and n12 1s 2 p12 1s 2 1 n22 1s 2 p22 1s 2 # 0. 
similarly, it cannot be that both n1
11s 2 p111s 2 1 n12 1s 2 p12 1s 2 # 0 and n211s 2 p211s 2 1 
n2
2 1s 2 p22 1s 2 # 0.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2:
By Theorem 1, in any coalition perfect equilibrium the monopolist gets at least 
the maximum possible profit that can be obtained in equilibrium with one network. 
Simple arguments establish that the latter is larger than zero, which implies the 
claims.
PROOF OF THEOREM 5:
Let s be a coalition perfect equilibrium such that the monopolist establishes two 
networks, and nk
j1s 2 . 0 5 j, k [ 51, 26. By Lemma 5.1 there exists j such that p1j 1s 2 
$ p2
j 1s 2 and p12j 1s 2 # p22j 1s 2 .
Suppose that p1
j 1s 2 5 p2j 1s 2 and p12j 1s 2 5 p22j 1s 2 . Since s is a Nash equilibrium 
and nk
j1s 2 . 0 5 j, k [ 51, 26, it must be that n111s 2 5 n211s 2 and n12 1s 2 5 n22 1s 2 . Then 
Lem ma 5.2 implies that for small enough e . 0, it is profitable for the monopolist 
to deviate to establishing only one network and setting prices pj 5 max 10, p1j 1s 2 1 
d j 1n12j, 2n12j 2 2 2 e, p2j 5 max 10, p12j 1s 2 1 d2j 1n1j, 2n1j 2 2 2 e, given that consumers 
are coalitionally rational in the resulting subgame (where d j 12 and d2j 12 denote the 
universal lower bounds on incremental utilities from A1). This is because given the 
above assumptions, all consumers who join some network in s join network 1 after 
the prescribed deviation.
The above imply that there exists j such that p1
j 1s 2 . p2j 1s 2 and p12j 1s 2 # p22j 1s 2 . 
Since s is a Nash equilibrium and nk
j1s 2 . 0 5 j, k [ 51, 26, it must be that n12j 1s 2 . 
n2
2j 1s 2 and n1j 1s 2 # n2j 1s 2 .
PROOF OF THEOREM 6:
Let s be a coalition perfect equilibrium such that the monopolist establishes two 
networks, and nk
j1s 2 . 0 5 j, k [ 51, 26. By Lemma 5.1 there exists j such that p1j 1s 2 
$ p2
j 1s 2 and p12j 1s 2 # p22j 1s 2 .
Suppose that p1
j 1s 2 5 p2j 1s 2 and p12j 1s 2 5 p22j 1s 2 . Since s is a Nash equilibrium and 
nk
j1s 2 . 0 5 j, k [ 51, 26, it must be that n111s 2 5 n211s 2 and n12 1s 2 5 n22 1s 2 . Lemma 
5.2 implies that at least one of p1
j 1s 2 . 0 and p12j 1s 2 . 0 holds. Then for small enough 
e . 0, it is profitable for the monopolist to deviate to establishing only one network 
and setting prices pj 5 2p1
j 1s 2 2 e, p2j 5 max 10, 2p12j 1s 2 2 2 e, given that consumers 
are coalitionally rational in the resulting subgame. This is because given the above 
assumptions, all consumers who join some network in s join network 1 after the 
prescribed deviation.
Suppose next that p1
j 1s 2 5 p2j 1s 2 K pˆ j and p12j 1s 2 . p22j 1s 2 . Since s is a Nash 
equilibrium and nk
j1s 2 . 0 5 j, k [ 51, 26, it must be that n12j 1s 2 5 n22j 1s 2 K n 2j 
and n1
j 1s 2 . n2j 1s 2 . If p12j 1s 2 # 0, then Lemma 5.2 implies that a deviation which 
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involves establishing one network and pricing it such that p2j 5 2e, pj 5 2p1
j 1s 2 2 e 
is profitable for small enough e, given that consumers are coalitionally rational in 
the resulting subgame. Therefore, it has to be that p1
2j 1s 2 . 0. If 3n2j 1s 2/n1j 1s 2 4p12j 1s 2 
. p2
2j 1s 2 then 1n1j 1s 2 1 n2j 1s 2 2 pˆ j 1 2p12j 1s 2n 2j . n1j 1s 2 pˆ j 1 n2j 1s 2 pˆ j 1 p12j 1s 2n 2j 1 
p2
2j 1s 2n 2j.
Note that the right-hand side of the above inequality is the profit the monopolist 
gets in s, while the left-hand side is a profit level that can be approximated arbi-
trarily closely by a deviation in which the monopolist establishes one network and 
sets prices such that p j 5 pˆ j 2 e, p2j 5 5 3n1j 1s 2 1 n2j 1s 2 4 /n1j 1s 2 6p12j 1s 2 2 e, given 
that consumers are coalitionally rational in the resulting subgame and utility func-
tions are convex. This is because the above assumptions imply that all  consumers 
on side j who join network 1 in s join network 1 after the above deviation too. 
This contradicts that s is a coalition perfect equilibrium. Therefore, it has to be 
that 3n2j 1s 2/n1j 1s 2 4 p12j 1s 2 # p22j 1s 2 . Note that this in particular implies p22j 1s 2 . 0. 
Then
 n1
j 1s 2 1 n2j 1s 2 n1j 1s 2 1 n2j 1s 22n1j 1s 2pj 1 2n2j 1s 2pj 1 n12j 1s 2p22j 1s 2          1 n22j 1s 2p22j 1s 2           n2j 1s 2 n2j 1s 2
   . n1
j 1s 2pj 1 n2j 1s 2pj 1 p12j 1s 2n 2j 1 p22jn 2j.
Note that the right-hand side of this inequality is the profit the monopolist gets in 
s, while the left-hand side is a profit level that can be approximated arbitrarily closely 
by a deviation in which the monopolist establishes one network and sets prices such 
that pj 5 2pˆ j 2 e, p2j 5 p2
2j 1s 2 3n1j 1s 2 1 n2j 1s 2 4/n2j 1s 2 2 e, given that consumers 
are coalitionally rational in the resulting subgame and utility functions are convex 
(implying that all consumers on side j who join some network in s join network 1 
after the above deviation).
This concludes that there exists j such that p1
j 1s 2 . p2j 1s 2 and p12j 1s 2 , p22j 1s 2 . 
Then equilibrium conditions for the consumers imply n1
j 1s 2 , n2j 1s 2 and n12j 1s 2 . 
n2
2j 1s 2 .
PROOF OF THEOREM 7:
Suppose E s [ s such that s is a coalition perfect equilibrium in which the monop-
olist establishes two networks and nk
j1s 2 . 0 5 j [ 51, 26 and k [ 5A, B6.
By Theorem 6 E k [ 51, 26 such that pk11s 2 , p21 k1s 2 and pk21s 2 . p22k1s 2 . 
Let l1 5 1nk11s 2 1 n21k1s 2 2 infi[ 30, 14:cij 1s 25k gi11nk2 1s 2 1 n22k1s 2 2 , h1 5 1nk11s 2 1 
n2
1
k1s 2 2 infi[ 30, 14:cij 1s 252k gi11nk2 1s 2 1 n22k1s 2 2 , l2 5 1nk2 1s 2 1 n22k1s 2 2 infi[ 30, 14:cij 1s 252k 
gi
2 1nk11s 2 1 n21k1s 2 2 and let h2 5 1nk2 1s 2 1 n22k1s 2 2 infi[ 30, 14:cij 1s 25k gi2 1nk11s 2 1 
n2
1
k1s 2 2 . Since s is a Nash equilibrium and utility functions are convex, pk11s 2 
# 31/ 1nk11s 2 1 n21k1s 2 2 4 l1 3nk2 1s 2/ 1nk2 1s 2 1 n22k1s 2 2 4 and p22k1s 2 # 31/ 1nk2 1s 2 1 
n2
2
k1s 2 2 4 l2 3nk11s 2/ 1nk11s 2 1 n21k1s 2 2 4 (otherwise consumers on side 1 who join k and 
consumers on side 2 who join 2k in s would be better off not joining any network). 
Similarly, p2
1
k1s 2 # 31/ 1nk11s 2 1 n21k1s 2 2 4h1 3n22k1s 2 2 nk2 1s 2 4/ 3nk2 1s 2 1 n22k1s 2 4 1 
pk
11s 2 and pk21s 2 # 31/ 1nk2 1s 2 1 n22k1s 2 2 4h2 3nk11s 2 2 n21k1s 2 4/ 3nk11s 2 1 n21k1s 2 4 1 p22k1s 2 
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(otherwise  consumers on side 1 who join 2k and consumers on side 2 who join k 
in s would be better off switching networks). Let x1 5 n2
1
k1s 2/ 1nk11s 2 1 n21k1s 2 2 and 
x2 5 nk
2 1s 2/ 1n22k1s 2 1 nk2 1s 2 2 . Then pM 1s 2 # x2l111 2 x12 1 1 11 2 2x22h1 1 x2l12x1 1 
x1l 2 11 2 x22 1 1 11 2 2x12h2 1 x1h22x2 5 h1x1 1 h2x2 1 l1x2 1 l 2x1 2 2h1x1x2 2 
2h2x1x2. It is easy to verify that the latter expression is maximized at x1 5 1h2 1 
l12/ 12h1 1 2h22 , x2 5 1h1 1 l12/ 12h1 1 2h22 . Substituting these values into the expres-
sion yields pM 1s 2 # 3 1h1 1 l22 1h2 1 l12 4/2 1h1 1 h22 .
Let Cˆ 1s 2 5 5Cij [ C : cij 1s 2 Z ~6. Consider a deviation by the monopolist in which 
only one network is established and prices are set such that pj 5 31/ 1nkj1s 2 1 nj2k 1s 2 2 4 l j 
2 e 5 j [ 51, 26, where e . 0. The profit of the monopolist after this deviation is at 
least l1 1 l 2 2 e 1gj51, 2 gk51, 2 nkj1s 2 2 , given that consumers play coalitionally ratio-
nalizable strategies in the resulting subgame and their utility functions are convex 
(since then joining the network is a supported restriction for the coalition Cˆ 1s 2). 
Since e can be taken arbitrarily small, the above implies that pM 1s 2 $ l1 1 l 2, which 
can only be if 3 1h1 1 l22 1h2 1 l12 4/2 1h1 1 h22 $ l1 1 l 2.
It is straightforward to verify that for any h1 1 h2 5 h . 0 and l1 1 l2 5 l . 0 the 
expression 3 1h1 1 l22 1h2 1 l12 4/2 1h1 1 h22 2 l1 2 l2 is maximized at h1 5 h2 5 h/2, 
l1 5 l2 5 l/2. In that case, 3 1h1 1 l22 1h2 1 l12 4/2 1h1 1 h22 2 l1 2 l2 5 h2 2 6hl 1 
l 2. Hence, a coalition perfect equilibrium with two active networks can only exist if 
h2 2 6hl 1 l 2 $ 0. Given that h . l, this implies h $ 13 1 2!2– 2 l. Therefore, if the 
dispersion of utilities on both sides of the market is less than 13 1 2!2– 2 , then there 
cannot exist a coalition perfect equilibrium with two active networks.
LEMMA 3: Let there be two firms in the market. In the subgame following price 
announcements 10, 02 10, 02 strategy ~ is not coalitionally rationalizable for any Cij 
[ C.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3:
In this subgame, 51, 26 is a supported restriction for C, since for any consumer (on 
either side of the market) and for any belief the consumer might have that is compat-
ible with all other consumers playing according to the restriction, at least one of 1 or 
2 gives a strictly positive payoff, while ~ gives a zero payoff.
LEMMA 4: Let there be two firms in the market, and assume that s is a coalition 
perfect equilibrium. If n1
j 1s 2 . 0 for some j [ 51, 26 and n21 1s 2 5 n22 1s 2 5 0, then 
(i) p1
11s 2 5 2p12 1s 2 , (ii) p1j 1s 2 # uj 5 j [ 51, 26 and (iii) n111s 2 5 n12 1s 2 5 1. similarly, 
if n2
j 1s 2 . 0 for some j [ 51, 26 and n111s 2 5 n12 1s 2 5 0, then (i) p211s 2 5 2p22 1s 2 , (ii) 
p2
j 1s 2 # uj 5 j [ 51, 26 and (iii) n211s 2 5 n22 1s 2 5 1.
PROOF OF LEMMA 4:
Note that n2
11s 2 5 n22 1s 2 5 0 implies p2 1s 2 5 0. Suppose p1j 1s 2 . uj for some j [ 51, 26. Then n1j 1s 2 5 0 since consumers cannot get negative utility in s. Then n12j 1s 2 
. 0 implies that p1
2j 1s 2 # 0, again because consumers cannot get negative utility in 
s. Since firm 1 cannot have negative profit in s, this implies p1
2j 1s 2 5 0. Consider the 
deviation 1u1 2 e, 2e 2 by firm 2, where e . 0. In the subgame following this devia-
tion it is a supported restriction for C1 < C2 to play 2, because that profile yields 
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the highest possible payoff in this subgame for every Ci
j [ C, and choosing 1 or ~ 
yields a strictly smaller payoff than this maximum no matter what strategies other 
consumers play. Then if consumers are coalitionally rational, firm 2’s profit after this 
deviation is u 2 2e, which is positive for small enough e. This contradicts that s is an 
equilibrium. This concludes that p1
j 1s 2 # uj 5 k 5 1, 2.
Suppose now that p1
11s 2 1 p12 1s 2 . 0. Consider the deviation 1p111s 2 2 e, p12 1s 2 2 e 2 
by firm 2, where e . 0. By Lemma 5.1 after this deviation all consumers choose 2, 
therefore firm 2’s profit is p1
11s 2 1 p12 1s 2 2 2e, which is positive for small enough e, 
a contradiction. This concludes that p1
11s 2 1 p12 1s 2 # 0.
Suppose now that p1
11s 2 1 p12 1s 2 , 0. This implies p1j 1s 2 , 0 for some j [ 51, 26. 
Then n2
j 1s 2 5 0 implies n1j 1s 2 5 1, since 1 strictly dominates ~ for side 1 consumers. 
But then p1
11s 2 1 p12 1s 2 , 0 implies p11s 2 5 p111s 2n111s 2 1 p12 1s 2n12 1s 2 , 0, a contra-
diction. This concludes that p1
11s 2 1 p12 1s 2 5 0.
Consider now p1
11s 2 5 p12 1s 2 5 0. Then p11s 2 5 0. If p2j 1s 2 , 0 for some j [ 51, 26, 
then ~ is a strictly dominated strategy for side j consumers, and therefore n2j 1s 2 5 0 
implies n1
j 1s 2 5 1. Then choosing 1 yields utility u2j . 0 for side 2j consumers, and 
therefore n2
2j 1s 2 5 0 implies n12j 1s 2 5 1. Suppose now that p211s 2 . 0 and p22 1s 2 5 0. 
Then by Lemma 5.1, a deviation min 1u 2 e, pB1 1s 2 2 e 2 , 2e by firm 1 for e . 0 guar-
antees that all consumers choose 1, which for small enough e yields positive profit for 
firm 1, contradicting that s is an equilibrium. A symmetric argument rules out that 
p2
11s 2 5 0 and p22 1s 2 . 0. If p211s 2 5 p22 1s 2 5 0, then Lemma 8.1 implies that n1j 1s 2 1 
n2
j 1s 2 5 1 5 j [ 51, 26, and then n211s 2 5 n22 1s 2 5 0 implies n111s 2 5 n12 1s 2 5 1.
LEMMA 5: Let there be two firms in the market, and assume that ui
j 5 uj 5 j [ 51, 26 
and i [ 30, 14 . Let s be a coalition perfect equilibrium such that n1j 1s 2 . 0 for some 
j [ 51, 26 and n2j 1s 2 . 0 for some j [ 51, 26. Then p111s 2 5 p211s 2 5 2p12 1s 2 5 2p22 1s 2 
and p1
j 1s 2 # uj 5 j [ 51, 26. Moreover, n111s 2 5 n12 1s 2 5 n211s 2 5 n22 1s 2 5 1/2.
PROOF OF LEMMA 5:
Suppose pk
j1s 2 . uj for some j, k [ 51, 26. W.l.o.g. assume p111s 2 . u1. Then n111s 2 
5 0 and therefore n1
2 1s 2 . 0. This is only compatible with s being a Nash equilib-
rium if p1
2 1s 2 5 0. Then by Lemma 5.1 a price announcement 1u1 2 e, 2e 2 by firm 2 
for e . 0 guarantees that all consumers choose 2, which for small enough e yields 
positive profit for firm 2. Therefore p11s 2 5 0 and p2 1s 2 . 0. The latter can only be 
if both n2
11s 2 . 0  and n22 1s 2 . 0, which imply that p2j 1s 2 , u j 5 j [ 51, 26. Then by 
Lemma 5.1, a deviation 1 p211s 2 2 e,  p22 1s 2 2 e 2 by firm 1 for e . 0 guarantees that 
all consumers choose 1. For small enough e, this deviation profit is close to p2
11s 2 1 
p2
2 1s 2 . If p2j 1s 2 $ 0 5 j [ 51, 26, then p2 1s 2 . 0 implies p211s 2 1 p22 1s 2 . 0, which 
implies that the above deviation is profitable for small enough e. If p2
2 1s 2 # 0, then 
p2 1s 2 . 0 implies n211s 2 . 0, but then n12 1s 2 . 0 contradicts that every consumer 
plays a best response in s. Therefore p2
2 1s 2 . 0. If p211s 2 , 0 and p22 1s 2 . 0, then 
n2
11s 2 5 1 since 2 is the unique best response after the equilibrium price announce-
ments for side 1 consumers, and therefore p2
11s 2 1 p22 1s 2 $ p211s 2n211s 2 1 p22 1s 2n22 1s 2 
5 p2 1s 2 . 0. This implies that the above deviation for firm 1 is profitable for small 
enough e, contradicting that s is a Nash equilibrium. This concludes that pk
j1s 2 # uj 
5 j, k [ 51, 26.
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Suppose p1
j 1s 2 Z p2j 1s 2 for some j [ 51, 26. W.l.o.g. assume p111s 2 . p211s 2 . Then 
p1
2 1s 2 # p22 1s 2 , otherwise Lemma 5.1 implies n111s 2 5 n12 1s 2 5 0. Suppose first that 
n1
11s 2 5 n211s 2 5 0. Then n12 1s 2 . 0 and n22 1s 2 . 0. This is only compatible with 
consumers being in equilibrium and firms not getting negative profit if p1
2 1s 2 5 p22 1s 2 
5 0. Then p2 1s 2 5 0. Then by Lemma 5.1, a deviation min 1u 2 e, p111s 2 2 e 2 , 2e 
by B for e . 0 guarantees that all consumers choose 1, which for small enough e 
yields positive profit for firm 2, contradicting that s is an equilibrium. Suppose next 
that n1
2 1s 2 5 n22 1s 2 5 0. Then n111s 2 . 0 and n211s 2 . 0, which contradicts that s is 
a Nash equilibrium, since n1
2 1s 2 5 n22 1s 2 5 0 and p111s 2 . p211s 2 implies that for any 
consumer on side 1, given the other players’ strategies, 2 is a better response than 1 
in the subgame following the equilibrium price announcements in s. This concludes 
that nk
11s 2 . 0 for some k [ 51, 26 and nk11s 2 . 0 for some k [ 51, 26. Then n111s 2 
# n2
11s 2 and n12 1s 2 . n22 1s 2 , otherwise p111s 2 . p211s 2 and p12 1s 2 # p22 1s 2 imply that 
some consumers are not playing a best response in s. Consider now following two 
deviations. The first is 1p211s 2 2 e, p22 1s 2 2 e 2 by firm 1, and the second is 1p111s 2 2 
e, p1
2 1s 2 2 e 2 by firm 2. Since pkj1s 2 # uk 5 j, k [ 51, 26, Lemma 5.1 implies that after 
the first deviation all consumers choose 1, and after the second deviation all consum-
ers choose 2. Then the first deviation yields a profit p2
11s 2 1 p22 1s 2 2 2e to firm 1, while 
the second one yields p1
11s 2 1 p12 1s 2 2 2e to firm 2. The sum of these deviation profits 
is p1
11s 2 1 p12 1s 2 1 p211s 2 1 p22 1s 2 2 4e. The sum of the two firms’ equilibrium profits 
is n1
11s 2p111s 2 1 n12 1s 2p12 1s 2 1 n211s 2p211s 2 1 n22 1s 2p22 1s 2 K p*. Note that p211s 2 , 0 
implies that n1
11s 2 1 n12 1s 2 5 1, since then ~ is never a best response for any consumer 
on side 1. Similarly, p1
2 1s 2 , 0 implies that n211s 2 1 n22 1s 2 5 1. Then by n111s 2 # n211s 2 , 
n1
2 1s 2 . n22 1s 2 , p111s 2 . p211s 2 , and p12 1s 2 # p22 1s 2 , it has to hold that n111s 2p111s 2 1 
n1
2 1s 2p12 1s 2 1 n211s 2p211s 2 1 n22 1s 2p22 1s 2 , 1/2 1p111s 2 1 p12 1s 2 1 p211s 2 1 p22 1s 2 2 . The left 
hand side of this inequality is nonnegative (it is the sum of equilibrium profits); there-
fore the right hand side is positive, which implies that also n1
11s 2p211s 2 1 n12 1s 2p12 1s 2 1 
n2
11s 2p211s 2 1 n22 1s 2p22 1s 2 , p111s 2 1 p12 1s 2 1 p211s 2 1 p22 1s 2 . This implies that for small 
enough e, the sum of the two deviation profits above is larger than the sum of the two 
equilibrium profits, implying that at least one of the deviations is profitable, a contra-
diction. This concludes that p1
j 1s 2 5 p2j 1s 2 5 j [ 51, 26.
Suppose that p11s 2 1 p2 1s 2 . 0. W.l.o.g. assume p11s 2 $ p2 1s 2 . Then p2 1s 2 , 
p1
11s 2 1 p12 1s 2 # p11s 2 1 p2 1s 2 (note that p1j 1s 2 5 p2j 1s 2 5 j [ 51, 26, and that p1j 1s 2 
, 0 implies that ci
j 1s 2 Z ~ 5 j [ 51, 26 and i [ 30, 14). By Lemma 5.1, a deviation 
p1
11s 2 2 e, p12 1s 2 2 e by firm 2 for e . 0 guarantees that all consumers choose 2, 
which yields a profit of p1
11s 2 1 p12 1s 2 2 2e to firm 2. This implies that the above 
deviation is profitable for small enough e, a contradiction. Then p11s 2 1 p2 1s 2 # 0 
and since equilibrium profits have to be nonnegative, p11s 2 5 p2 1s 2 5 0. Suppose 
p1
11s 2 1 p12 1s 2 . 0. By Lemma 5.1, a deviation p111s 2 2 e, p12 1s 2 2 e by firm 2 for e . 
0 guarantees that all consumers choose 2, which yields a profit of p1
11s 2 1 p12 1s 2 2 2e 
to firm 2. But for small enough e, this profit is positive, which contradicts that p2 1s 2 
5 0 and that s is an equilibrium. This concludes that p1
11s 2 1 p12 1s 2 # 0. Suppose 
p1
11s 2 1 p12 1s 2 , 0. Then p1j 1s 2 5 p2j 1s 2 , 0 for some j [ 51, 26. Then n1j 1s 2 1 n2j 1s 2 
5 1, since ~ is never a best response for any consumer on side j in the subgame 
after the equilibrium price announcements. But then min 1p11s 2 , p2 1s 2 2 , 0, con-
tradicting that s is a Nash equilibrium. This concludes that p1
11s 2 1 p12 1s 2 5 0. If 
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p1
j 1s 2 5 p2j 1s 2 , 0 for some j [ 51, 26, then n1j 1s 2 1 n2j 1s 2 5 1. Then nonnegativity 
of equilibrium profits implies that also n1
2j 1s 2 1 n22j 1s 2 5 1 and that n111s 2 5 n12 1s 2 , 
n2
11s 2 5 n22 1s 2 . If p111s 2 5 p211s 2 5 p12 1s 2 5 p22 1s 2 5 0, then by Lemma 5.1, n1k 1s 2 1 
n2
k 1s 2 5 1 5 k 5 1, 2. As shown above, n1j 1s 2 1 n2j 1s 2 . 0 5 j [ 51, 26. Then p1j 1s 2 
5 p2
j 1s 2 5 j [ 51, 26 implies n1j 1s 2 5 n2j 1s 2 5 j [ 51, 26. This implies p11s 2 5 p2 1s 2 . 
If p1
j 1s 2 5 p2j 1s 2 , 0 for some j [ 51, 26, then the above implies that n1j 1s 2 5 n2j 1s 2 
5 1/2. Then p1
11s 2 1 p12 1s 2 5 0 and nonnegativity of equilibrium profits together 
imply that also n1
2j 1s 2 5 n22j 1s 2 5 1/2. If p111s 2 5 p211s 2 5 p12 1s 2 5 p22 1s 2 5 0, then 
n1
j 1s 2 1 n2j 1s 2 5 1 5 j [ 51, 26 and the fact that s is a Nash equilibrium imply that 
n1
j 1s 2 5 n2j 1s 2 5 1/2 5 j [ 51, 26.
PROOF OF THEOREM 8:
Lemmas 8.2 and 8.3 establish that there are no other coalition perfect equilibria 
with one or two active firms than those stated in the claim. All that remains to be 
shown is that there is no coalition perfect equilibrium with no active firm.
Suppose n1
j 1s 2 1 n2j 1s 2 5 0 5 j [ 51, 26. Then p11s 2 5 p2 1s 2 5 0. If pkj1s 2 , 0 for 
some j, k [ 51, 26, then n1j 1s 2 1 n2j 1s 2 5 1, since ~ is a never best response strategy 
for any consumer on side j, a contradiction. Suppose now that E k [ 51, 26 such that 
pk
11s 2 , pk21s 2 $ 0, and pkj1s 2 . 0 for some j [ 51, 26. W.l.o.g. assume p111s 2 . 0 (and 
p1
2 1s 2 $ 0). By Lemma 5.1, the deviation min 1u1 2 e, p111s 2 2 e 2 , min 1u2 2 e, p12 1s 2 2 
e 2 by firm 2 for e . 0 guarantees that every consumer joins firm 2, and it yields 
strictly positive profit for small enough e, a contradiction. If pk
j1s 2 5 0 5 j 5 1, 2 and 
k [ 51, 26, then n1j 1s 2 1 n2j 1s 2 5 1 5 j [ 51, 26 by Lemma 8.2. This concludes that 
if s is a coalition perfect equilibrium, then it cannot be that n1
j 1s 2 1 n2j 1s 2 5 0 5 j 
[ 51, 26.
PROOF OF THEOREM 9:
W.l.o.g. assume that j 5 1 (the other case is perfectly symmetric), so u1 , u2.
By Theorem 8, if nk
11s 2 1 nk2 1s 2 . 0 for some k [ 51, 26, then pk11s 2 5 2pk21s 2 and 
pk
l 1s 2 # ul 5 l 5 1, 2. Furthermore, p11s 2 5 p2 1s 2 5 0.
Assume n1
11s 2 1 n12 1s 2 . 0 and suppose p111s 2 . u1 2 u2. Consider the deviation 
p1
11s 2 2 u1 2 e, u2 2 e by firm 2 for e . 0. In the subgame following the deviation, 
is a strictly dominant strategy for every consumer on side 1, therefore it is the only 
rationalizable strategy. But then 2 is the only rationalizable strategy in the subgame 
for every consumer on side 2, too. Therefore, after the above deviation, firm 2’s profit 
is p1
11s 2 2 u1 1 u2 2 2e. Since p111s 2 . u1 2 u2, this profit is strictly positive for small 
enough e, contradicting that s is an equilibrium. A perfectly symmetric argument 
shows that it cannot be that n2
11s 2 1 n22 1s 2 . 0 and p211s 2 . u1 2 u2.
PROOF OF THEOREM 10:
Let s be a coalition perfect equilibrium.
Suppose first that nk
j1s 2 5 0 for some j, k [ 51, 26. W.l.o.g. assume n111s 2 5 0. Then 
either n1
11s 2 5 n12 1s 2 5 0 or n12 1s 2 . 0 and p111s 2 5 0. In either case, p1 5 0 and then 
by the starting assumption p2 1s 2 . 0. Let Cˆ2 be the set of consumers who choose 
2 in s. Note that p2
j 1s 2 , 0 for some j [ 51, 26 implies that Cj , Cˆ2. Consider now 
deviation 1p211s 2 2 e, p22 1s 2 2 e 2 for e . 0 by firm 1. By Lemma 5.1, in the subgame 
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after this deviation 1 is the unique coalitionally rationalizable strategy for every 
 consumer in Cˆ2. But then for small enough e the deviation is profitable, a contradic-
tion. Therefore nk
j1s 2 . 0 5 j, k [ 51, 26.
If p1
j 1s 2 . p2j 1s 2 5 j [ 51, 26, then by Lemma 5.1, nA11s 2 5 nA2 1s 2 5 0 contradicting 
the above result. Similarly, it cannot be that p1
j 1s 2 , p2j 1s 2 5 j [ 51, 26.
Consider now p1
j 1s 2 5 p2j 1s 2 5 j [ 51, 26. Let Cˆ be the set of consumers who join 
some network in s. There exists k [ 51, 26 such that pk 1s 2 # 1p11s 2 1 p2 1s 2 2/2 . 0. 
W.l.o.g. assume k 5 1. Consider deviation 1p211s 2 2 e, p22 1s 2 2 e 2 by 1. By Lemma 5.1, 
every consumer in Cˆ chooses 1 after the deviation. Therefore, if e is small enough, 
then after this deviation firm 1’s profit is larger than 1p11s 2 1 p2 1s 2 2/2 (note that 
p2
j 1s 2 , 0 for some j [ 51, 26 implies that Cj , Cˆ), a contradiction.
Finally, notice that if p1
j 1s 2 # p2j 1s 2 for some j [ 51, 26, then n2j 1s 2 . 0 and the 
assumption that s is a Nash equilibrium imply that n2
2j 1s 2 $ n12j 1s 2 . If p1j 1s 2 , 
p2
j 1s 2 for some j [ 51, 26, then n2j 1s 2 . 0 and the assumption that s is a Nash equi-
librium imply that n2
2j 1s 2 . n12j 1s 2 . Similarly, if p2j 1s 2 # p1j 1s 2 (correspondingly 
p2
j 1s 2 , p1j 1s 2) for some j [ 51, 26, then n22j 1s 2 # n12j 1s 2 (correspondingly n22j 1s 2 , 
n1
2j 1s 2).
PROOF OF THEOREM 11:
Let D 5 maxj[51, 26 supi, i9[ 30, 14 uij/ui9j  and let s be a coalition perfect equilibrium. By 
the starting assumption, D # 4/3.
Assume there is a coalition perfect equilibrium different than 1 or 2 in the state-
ment of the theorem. Then by Lemma 5.1 E j [ 51, 26 such that p1j 1s 2 , p2j 1s 2 , n1j 1s 2 
$ n2
j 1s 2 and p12j 1s 2 $ p22j 1s 2 , n12j 1s 2 , n22j 1s 2 . For every j [ 51, 26, let infi[ 30, 14 uij 
K l j. Note that D # 4/3 implies that l j . 0.
If pk
j1s 2 # l j 5 j, k [ 51, 26, then an analogous proof to that of Lemma 8.3 estab-
lishes that there is a profitable deviation for at least one firm, contradicting that s 
is a coalition perfect equilibrium. The same holds if pk
j1s 2 $ 0 5 j, k [ 51, 26. It is 
straightforward to show that it cannot be that for some k [ 51, 26, it holds that pkj1s 2 
. l j 5 j [ 51, 26. Below we consider the remaining possibilities.
Consider first the case that for some j, k [ 51, 26, it holds that pkj1s 2 . l j, pk2j 1s 2 , 
0 and 0 # p2
1
k1s 2 , p22k1s 2 . Since supk ukj # Dl j # 4/3l j and pkj1s 2 . l j, for nkj1s 2 . 0 it 
has to be that nk
2j1s 2 . 3/4 (otherwise no consumer on side j would join k at a price 
larger than l j ). Furthermore, pk
j1s 2 . pj2k 1s 2 implies nkj1s 2 # 1/2, and supk ukj # Dl j 
# 4/3l j implies pk
j1s 2 , 4/3l j. Therefore pk 1s 2 # 2/3l j 1 3/4pk2j 1s 2 . This implies 0 # 
2/3l j 1 3/4pk
2j 1s 2 , which in turn implies 2/3l j 1 3/4pk2j 1s 2 # l j # 9/8  pk2j 1s 2 # l j 1 pk2j 1s 2 . 
Therefore pk 1s 2 # l j 1 pk2j 1s 2 . But note that 2k can get a profit arbitrarily close 
to l j 1 pk
2j 1s 2 by deviating to price announcements 1l j 2 e, pk2j 1s 2 2 e 2 for small 
enough e . 0 (since by Lemma 5.1, after that price announcement all consumers 
choose 2). So if p2k 1s 2 # pk 1s 2 , then 2k  has a profitable deviation from s. On the 
other hand note that k can get a profit arbitrarily close to l j 1 pk
2j 1s 2 by deviating to 
price announcements 1p21 k1s 2 2 e, p22k1s 2 2 e 2 for small enough e . 0. So if p2k 1s 2 
. pk 1s 2 then k has a profitable deviation from s. This concludes that s cannot be a 
coalition perfect equilibrium, a contradiction.
Consider now the case that for some j, j9, k [ 51, 26, it holds that pkj1s 2 . l j and 0 
. p j92k 1s 2 . Just like in the previous case, it has to be that nk2j1s 2 . 3/4 and therefore 
VoL. 1 no. 1 51AMBrus And ArgEnzIAno: AsyMMETrIC nETworks In Two-sIdEd MArkETs
n2
2
k
j 1s 2 , 1/4. Then supk ukj # Dl j # 4/3l j implies pj2k 1s 2 , 1/3l j. Then 0 . p j92k 1s 2 and 
4/3l j . p2
2
k
j91s 2 imply that p2k 1s 2 , 1/3l j. Since nkj1s 2 # 1/2 and pkj1s 2 # 4/3l jnk2j 1s 2 and 
pk 1s 2 $ 0, it holds that 2/3l jnk2j 1s 2 1 pk2j 1s 2nk2j 1s 2 $ 0, therefore pk2j 1s 2 $ 22/3l j. 
Therefore l j 1 pk
2j 1s 2 $ 1/3l j. But note that 2k can get a profit arbirarily close to l j 1 
pk
2j 1s 2 by deviating to price announcement 1l j 2 e, pk2j 1s 2 2 e 2 for small enough e . 
0. This concludes that s cannot be a coalition perfect equilibrium, a contradiction.
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